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April 12, 1982 
The Honorable Mike Curb 
Lieutenant Governor of California 
State Capitol, Room 1028 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Governor Curb: 
It is my great pleasure to transmit to you as Chairman 
of the Commission for Economic Development the report 
of that Commission's Task Force on California's Water 
Future. 
This report contains extensive findings and a series 
of conclusions which are intended to assist the citizenry 
in voting June 8 on Proposition 9, the referendum on 
SB 200. 
The members of the Task Force wish to express their 
gratitude for the opportunity to study and report on 
this issue of critical importance to the economic future 
of our state. We have received the most generous support 
obtaining information from the numerous federal, state 
and local agencies involved in the various aspects of 
this issue, as well as from private citizens and public 
interest organizations. 
The Task Force 1 as you know, may not by law receive any 
public funds for its support. For that reason we are 
doubly grateful for the voluntary assistance given to 
us by all the above. 
The State Department of Water Resources, 
has devoted a great of time and had 
to our study. 
The Honorable Mike Curb -2-
Finally, without the report writing skills and sound 
technical advice of our water law counsel, Anne J. 
Schneider, this report would literally have been 
impossible. 
Most sincerely yours, 
' A. 
Ch 
.:ran Post 
Jos~eph E. 
I 
I 
 
Honorable Carol Hallett 
SUMMARY 
The Task Force on California's Water Future was appointed 
Lieutenant Governor Mike Curb, pursuant to his authori as 
Chairman of the Commission for Economic Development. The Task 
Force studied the issues associated with SB 200 and ACA 90 
has developed an extensive series of findings and conclusions 
which have been submitted to the Commission for Economic 
Development in this report dated April 12, 1982. 
Proposition 9 on the June 8, 1982 ballot is a referendum on SB 
200 and ACA 90. A vote to approve Proposition 9 would 
both SB 200 and ACA 90. A "no" vote would nullify both. SB 200 
provides for additional State Water Project (SWP) facilities, 
including the Peripheral Canal. SB 200 and ACA 90 together 
place substantial restrictions and conditions on construction 
of additional State Water Project facilities and State 
ect operations. (See Findings beginning at page 23 at 
page 74) 
COSTS (See Findings beginning at page 30) 
The total costs of SB 200 remain uncertain. e 
questions as to what is to be built, when it wi be built, 
what to include in the costs. Based on the construction 
i 
ule r a i tion rates cited by D trnent 
Water Resources (DWR), bond interest at current market rates, 
and the construction schedule if all SB 200 projects that DWR 
now intends to build are constructed, the Task Force 
concluded that total cost would approximate $19.3 billion, 
us other unknown costs. 
FEASIBILITY OF FINANCING THE COST (See Findings beginni at 
page 41) 
The ability to finance the full program in SB 200 is extr 
questionable due to problems with the three major i 
sources. These funding sources are: project revenues, 
tidelands revenues and bonds. Project revenues are currently 
strained to meet existing bond retirement obligations and 
current costs of the State Water Project. Tidelands revenues 
scheduled for water development have been transferred to 
balance the state's budget and addi tiona! transfers may 
needed in the future. Bonds programmed to fund the projects 
cannot reasonably be sold at the existing 8~% legal 1 it. 
current legal interest ceiling for power bonds has been rai 
to 13%, for example. If the legal interest ceiling is r sed 
to permit sales of water bonds the project costs rise 
A "pay-as-you-go" an developed by D tment wa 
Resources in response to Task Force questions about 
feasibility of bond financing turns out, upon examination, to 
be a device which merely shifts bond funding costs elsewhere. 
In part it transfers the costs to local districts whose 
are already strained, and in part it transfers project revenues 
from non-SB 200 projects of the Department to SB 200 es 
DWR would then expect to have to issue revenue bonds to finance 
the facilities from which the revenues have been transferred. 
The effect is "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul" ra 
"pay as you go". As such, it is misleading to label it as a 
proposal which avoids the costs of borrowing. 
RATES (See Findings beginning at page 52) 
Prospective water rates will depend primarily on uncert n 
factors such as future bond rates, inflation and energy costs 
Water rates are certain to rise sharply after 1983 to 
expiration of DWR's low-cost energy contracts negoti in 
1960's with public utilities. 
DWR has projected extraordinarily low energy cost increases 
based on the assumption that it will produce more than half 
its own power. The Task Force questions the extreme di i 
between public utilities' power rates and those which State 
water Project forecasts for itself. A number of the s 's 
iii 
energy sources are and ative as 
to the amount of power produced and its cost. This energy 
component of the State Water Project's water user rates needs 
careful review and verification by independent authorities. If 
power rates exceed DWR's projection the increases in SWP wa 
rates would be even more substantial. 
FISH AND WILDLIFE GUARANTEES (See Findings inni at 
71) 
SB 200 and ACA 90 provide stronger water quality protection 
measures in the Delta. The Peripheral Canal is r 
fish and game experts as the preferred Delta facility and a 
definite improvement over existing conditions. 
The Task Force, however, believes that the guarantees are 
s certain in real life than they appear from the 
SB 200. Federal Fish and Wildlife officials are skepti 
the effects of the experimental fish screens and incr 
export of water by the Peripheral Canal. SB 200 ires a 
two-year test of the fish screen and if it is determined to 
unsatisfactory, construction of the Canal would be s 
despite expeqditures already incurred in excess llion 
dollars. The Department of Fish and Game (DFG) 
preferred to experiment before commencing construction. e 
iv 
is no fi screen to the one to be ilt e n 
the wor 
REQUIRED AGREEMENTS ee Findings beginning at page 23 and 71) 
SB 200 requires that a number of conditions be met before 
canal can be utilized fully. The federal government must 
agree to meet the quality standards set by the State's Water 
Resources Control Board before the state can transport water 
for the federal CVP through the Canal. The Federal government 
currently will not agree to meet such a commitment, especi 
in dry or critically dry years. 
The DWR and DFG must also agree to restore, maintain and 
enhance as yet undefined historical standards for fish and 
wildlife in the Delta. Similarly undefined are the standards 
for operation of the fish screens proposed for the Peripher 
Canal. 
In view of the numerous factors contributing to the decline 
fisheries and wildlife, including industrial lution, it wi 
be difficult for DFG to single out the harmful effects 
exclusively by the water projects. The DFG, in fact, states 
that it cannot at this point make such a termination 
separate effects. These uncertainties make it diffi t to see 
v 
statutory r irement to restore, maintain even 
enhance historical fish and wildlife standards can be 
implemented. 
WHO PAYS AND WHO BENEFITS? (See Findings beginning at page 52) 
The Metropolitan Water District of southern Cali ia 
pays for considerably more SWP water than it es 
receives. At the same time, the Kern County water 
benefits from the fact that it can buy surplus water from e 
SWP at surplus prices of $5 an acre-foot. Through 198 e 
Kern County water Agency has used 47 percent of the water 
delivered by the State Water Project but has paid only 11 
percent of the total cost. 
With in MWD, moreover, there are additional disparities ich 
appear to favor suburban users over residents of Ci 
Los Angeles. In urban areas the extensive use r 
taxes shifts the cost to small users. In the MWD oper 
tax is a major cost element. According to Members of Ci 
Council, in the current fiscal year, LA City will pay MWD $3.8 
million for water charges, but additionally will pay MWD $14.6 
million in property taxes. There is no dispute that water 
users in LA City pay a disproportionately high price 
amount of water they receive from MWD. 
vi 
(See inni a 
page 94) 
It must be expected that SB 200 will be challenged in numerous 
lawsuits. Even though ACA 90 provides for an expedited ocess 
for resolving some of those issues in state courts, some 
remedies will probably be sought in federal courts. 
Water development and export raise complex and devisive issues 
and will be the subject of lawsuits regardless of the vote on 
Proposition 9. It would appear that SB 200, however, by its 
uncertain terms and requirements particularly invites 
litigation. Any resulting delay will increase the costs of 
various projects and delay delivery of water or fulfillment of 
other project purposes. 
WHAT CAN BE BUILT IF PROPOSITION 9 FAILS? 
beginning at page 118) 
(See fi i 
It seems clear that the Peripheral Canal and certain 
features of SB 200 can be built under existing law ns-
Porter Act) even if Proposition 9 fails. Whether it 
politically feasible depends on the will of the governor. 
It would also be possible to build an alternative through-Delta 
facility. The Burns-Porter Act gives clearer authori 
vii 
construction of a rough-Delta facility than it for 
Peripheral Canal. 
WHEN IS WATER NEEDED IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
AND THE CENTRAL VALLEY? (See Findings beginning at page 108) 
There are numerous factors which must be consider in 
determining when water is needed in the Central Valley 
southern California. The MWD believes that, using it's 
assumptions, it will experience a water shortage in 1990 if 
that year is dry or critically dry. 
The Task Force believes MWD has overstated its demand in 1990 
and 2000. Likewise, MWD has understated the opportunity for 
short-term conservation and reliance on groundwater reserves in 
a dry year. MWD has assumed that all resources available to it 
will be short simultaneously. This is highly unlikely but 
could be met in any case by short-term insurance- type measures 
with a degree of water conservation not exceeding that achi 
in the 1976-77 drought. 
IS IT NECESSARY TO EXPORT MORE WATER? (See Findings beginni 
at page 116) 
some increased efficiency in agricultural and urban water 
is possible. Agricultural efficiency is high, however, and 
much water that may appear to be wasted is in fact added to 
viii 
underground basins or becomes available for downstream use. 
Nevertheless, there are improvements in pricing and marketing 
practices which could produce significant water economies, 
particularly in respect to existing use of water on land of 
productive value. Legal and institutional changes will 
required to achieve these economies. 
D~~ assumes that up to 700,000 AF of water can be 
annually through various wastewater reclamation 
conservation programs within SWP service areas. Additi 
water can be saved by exporting and storing surplus water in 
wet years in groundwater basins. 
There is a long-term and cyclical aspect to potential water 
--
needs and available supplies to meet those needs. Long-term 
growth will require more water. But there is presently excess 
or surplus water which is sold at cheap prices in normal years. 
A sound insurance-type approach to surplus years and dry years 
has the potential for meeting future needs with amounts which 
are less than those projected by the MWD and DWR. MWD 
historically overstated its prospective water demand. This 
appears to apply equally to its current forecasts. 
term needs of Southern California must be met as they 
definitively occur, however. 
ix 
IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PERIPHERAL CANAL? (See ___ _...__ 
beginning at page 76) 
The Task Force concludes that the consideration an 
alternative through-Delta approach offers an opportuni to 
meet necessary water export requirements at substantial 
costs and shorter water delivery times with no determi 
greater environmental risks than with a peripheral canal. 
X 
STATEMENT.OF CONCLUSIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Analysis of future water needs and probable costs and effects 
of water development in California is exceedingly complex. It 
involves myriads of assumptions, and California's t 
experience as to the accuracy of such assumptions in re to 
fisheries impact, demand, yield, and cost, for example, is not 
reassuring. SB 200 is a piece of legislation which at to 
provide assurances to all of the sharply differing interests 
which debated the issue in the Legislature. There are e 
who think it is a work of art in welding together the di t 
views. Conversely, there are those who believe it is 
unworkable that it tries to promise all things to 
people. 
The problems addressed by SB 200 and ACA 90 are not new. A long 
series of proposals to correct unsolved problems in 
original California Water Project as well as to increase 
export of water to the South have been studied and di 
for reasons of cost, engineering or pressure from 
interests. This is not to say that SB 200 has finally 
those problems. Rather, it is the specific legis ive 
decision which has now become the subject of a referendum. 
On June 8, 1982, the citizens of California will vote on 
Proposition 9 as a referendum measure to approve or ect 
xi 
senate Bill 200, enact in 1980 by the Legislature 
Governor. SB 200 mandates the building of the Peripher 
Canal and authorizes or reauthorizes new major facilities 
the existing State Water Project. On the one 
projects listed in SB 200 which are already authori 
existi law are already legally able to be financed ect 
revenues, tidelands funds, and the sale of bonds. On the r 
hand, however, what DWR may build , based on the i 
project and study descriptions in SB 200, is not certain or 
limited in any sense. SB 200 can be viewed as a " check 
to DWR for future project development. 
Allied with the vote on SB 200 is ACA 90, passed by the 
--
electorate in 1980 as Proposition 8, to provide somewhat 
stronger voter controls over existing Delta Water protection 
laws and over existing statutory limitations on development of 
North Coast rivers. If SB 200 is not approved, ACA 90 also 
dies. 
California water Task Force was created under au 
of the State Commission for Economic Development. It given 
months of study to the voluminous documents prepared state 
water agencies, heard extensive testimony from numerous state, 
federal and local public bodies and interested citizens, 
has developed a comprehensive report of findi 
conclusions on Proposition 9. 
xii 
Its deliberations centered on 1) costs, 2) anticipated 
financing methods, 3) prospective water rate increases, 4) the 
potential for benefit or damage to fisheries and wildlife, 5) 
the numerous uncertainties and risks embodied in the provisions 
of SB 200, 6) the merits and demerits of alternative 
engineering approaches to water transfer across the D ta, 
7) the potential water efficiencies and dry year reserves 
might substitute for or reduce the costs and risks of fur 
export of water from the Delta. 
It is immediately apparent that concerns for these various 
issues differ substantially in form and degree among 
various reg ions of the State. Many people in the counties 
surrounding and north of the Delta are greatly concerned with 
the impact of increased water exports on the Delta and San 
Francisco Bay. They are concerned that obtainable sources of 
water they will need for future development will be expor to 
the south and that their county of origin rights to that water 
be meaningless when the water is a well establi t 
of the demand of an ever growing Southern State. They are 
concerned that the State Water Resources Control Board 
power to change Delta water quality standards, and nei r 
200 nor ACA 90 limit that power. They are disturbed that 
requirement in SB 200 of reestablishing and maintai 
fisheries and ife at historical levels is a 
undefined goal within the control of the Department of Fish 
xiii 
Game, and possibly unachievable in any true sense. They are 
concerned that the decision making will constitutionally be 
placed in the hands of two political appointees serving at 
pleasure of the Governor, one of whom is the Director 
Department of Water Resources, the agency which runs the State 
Water Project. 
The counties to the south are principally concer 
prospective need for more water, and its cost to them as water 
users, both agricultural and urban. Farmers in the Centr 
valley fear that their water needs in critically d iods 
will not be met in view of the guarantees in SB 200 to fi ies 
and other Delta interests, added to the existing contract 
-
priority given to urban users. 
Both north and south should reasonably be concerned that 
costs to r icul ture, industry and for personal consumption 
are as low as feasible. Water rates, property taxes, ener 
prices and general commodity prices are pushed 
increased water costs. Water must be available conti 
growth of the state, but it is such a vital and pervasive 
element of the economy, affecting all consumers, that it 
be developed at the lowest economic cost, used in most 
efficient manner, and id for in a way which is ir to 
water users. Local districts impose water 
substantial property taxes on their residents for water use 
xiv 
which must also be considered along with the state's water 
financing program in assessing the full impact of further 
costly water development. 
Most of the official literature supplied by the state and 
water agencies with reference to SB 200 generally disr s 
these interrelated and supplemental local costs. Task 
Force attempted to together and consider car 
available information on every element of cost to 
understand the water program. 
Our analysis differs to varying degrees from many 
official water agencies' stated conclusions with r to 
-
cost reporting, fish and wildlife effects of the Per 
Canal, the feasibility of alternative water trans 
approaches, the contingencies and risks built into SB 200 and, 
finally, the extent to which water exports to cover growth 
dry years are needed at this time. 
COSTS 
Our analysis of costs differs markedly from the single est 
cited by the Legislative Analyst in the Ballot Pamphlet. Our 
study separately identifies the construction cost, the interest 
cost, and the inflation cost as calculated by DWR in its 
project Bulletins. It also identifies the additi cost to 
the local water districts, as reported by DWR, for capital 
XV 
costs of facilities which must be constructed to distri e t 
water locally. It takes note, without attempting to establi 
a hard estimate, of the impact which large new bond flotations 
will have on bond issues needed for other state local 
purposes, a cost normally recognized in analysis of propos 
bond issues and a matter of no small fiscal consequence. 
Because of the uncertainties of inflation rates, interest rates 
and these indirect bond effects, the Task Force has 
identify and consider each of these separately, as as· 
collectively. This treatment allows the voters to e 
independent judgments as to the cost elements and assumptions 
they think most appropriate or significant. This avoids 
--
confusion which has been generated by the numerous and varied 
approaches taken by the official water agencies and those who 
have used one or another of those estimates for partisan 
purposes. For various reasons, including differences in 
timing, which project facilities are included, and i ion 
or interest cost assumptions, estimates have ranged from $ 0 
million to $23 billion. 
The Task Force's findings as to cost estimates can 
summarized as follows: 
• The "in excess of $3.1 billion" figure shown in 
pamphlet is the construction cost of those projects lis n 
SB 200 which DWR now proposes to build, as though they were 
xvi 
built in January 1981 estimate includes no i tion ove 
the construction period to the year 2000, and includes no 
interest cost. 
e The $5.4 billion estimate reported by DWR to Task Force 
and in numerous bulletins, contains inflation at rates 
assumed to be reasonable by DWR, with the increas 
construction costs applied in accordance with the construction 
schedule projected by the Department. It includes no interest 
cost. 
e A cost of $12.5 billion results from adding to 
construction costs of $5.4 billion the interest costs as 
scheduled by DWR and its bond advisor, Dillon Read & Co., at 
--
8~% borrowing rates. 
8 Local district costs (costs which of necessity must 
reflected ultimately in the increased water rates of districts) 
add another $1.5 billion to the total cost, making it 
billion. This amount wi be funded by district bor 
available reserves, property taxes or user water rates. Even 
if districts do not borrow for the purpose there is sti an 
implicit or "economic interest" cost due to loss of interest 
earnings on the district revenues used to pay DWR. 
• In all of these foregoing estimates the Task Force 
the DWR inflation or interest rate assumptions. However, the 
xvii. 
Task Force believes that it is reasonable to tion r 
bonds can be sold at 8~%. The bond advisor to DWR informed the 
Task Force that it used 8~% only because that was the existi 
statutory limit, but that if the interest rate ceiling were 
raised to the level needed to meet current market condit 
the bonds could in its opinion be sold in the amounts 
by DWR. 
• If, for example, bonds were authorized to be sold at rates 
to 12%, the added bond interest cost would raise total state 
costs for SB 200 to $17.8 billion. A 12% rate is compar to 
other state issues where the legal interest ceiling has 
raised. To this should be added the local district costs 
distribution facilities of $1.5 billion, making a total 
$19.3 billion. 
FINANCING THE PROJECTS 
The ability to finance the full program contai in SB 200 
appears to be extremely questionable. For this reason DWR 
and MWD spokesmen have stated that the Peripheral Canal is 
main object of the bill -- in the words of MWD's witness, the 
only thing on the table", and therefore the only facili 
which financing would be required. 
The financial problem applies to all three of the inci 
xviii 
funds and bonds. 
Project revenues are currently strained to meet the r 
incurred bond obligations as well as the current costs 
California Water Project. Only as the bond repayment costs 
fall off will revenues significantly exceed current s 
and thus be available for additional project fundi Not 
until after 1985 will the California Water Project begin to 
acquire revenues in excess of its expenses. These ect 
revenue surpluses supply the major source of funding SB 200 
projects. 
Tidelands revenues are allocated to a number of state purposes 
--
including higher education. In recent years they have grown 
markedly with rising petroleum prices. The law accordingly was 
changed to reallocate those revenues to six special funds, wi 
prioritized target funding levels rather than fixed dollar or 
percentage amounts. The California Water Fund was 
for $25 million annually, and $5 million to the Centr 
Project Construction Fund. 
However, the 1981 Legislature transferred tideland funds to 
help balance the Budget. Again, in this year's t e 
Governor proposed additional transfers. The Cali ia water 
Fund and CVP Construction Fund would be reduced from $30 
million to less than half that amount. This is of particular 
xix 
significance to Peri ral Canal because it's f nanc 
depends heavily on those funds due to the limited project 
revenue situation described previously. DWR regards the 
funding slippage as a one year agreement with the Governor, 
arising out of the current budget crisis. The real stion 
however, is whether the state's fiscal problems are a one ar 
matter. All evidence is that they are not. 
According to the Legislative Analyst, "Any reduction of 
(tideland) revenues for more than one year would impair 
construction schedule of the project." Both the Contr ler 
DWR and a special DWR Task Force studying the s ect are 
similarly concerned about the department's serious fundi 
problems. An amount equal to approximately half the funding of 
the Peripheral Canal is programmed to come from tideland 
revenues. 
The third major source of financing for SB 200 is revenue 
bonds. It will be difficult to sell the bonds in curren 
poor market. Sales may be possible only if the present 
interest ceiling of 8~% is raised. The DWR alr is 
concerned about its ability to sell its power bonds at 
legal limit of 13% now established for those issues. DWR's 
proposal to sell over $2~ bi ion in revenue bonds for water 
projects will be the first use of revenue bonds 
purpose. It seems clear that they cannot be sold 
future at the current legal interest rate ceiling. 
XX 
t 
near 
DWR prepared "pay-as-you-go" studies that assumed no use of 
revenue bond financing. Surcharges would be imposed on 
contractors of up to 23% to obtain the necessary revenues. The 
Task Force believes that the "pay-as-you-go" s ies are 
misleading because they merely shift the costs to 
contractors and shift the need for revenue bond financi 
SB 200 facilities to non-SB 200 facilities. 
The mandate in SB 200 for immediate construction 
Peripheral Canal may be a financial fiction. ili 
from 
finance other of the SB 200 projects at the cost levels 
times scheduled by DWR is even more remote. Skepticism as to 
completing the projects in SB 200 was characteristic 1 
the testimony received from water ~gencies in the hearings of 
the Task Force. 
WATER RATE INCREASES 
The Task Force believes, as does DWR, that prospective water 
rates are important to consider along with costs. DWR, in 
fact, would give primary attention to water rates since water 
rates take into account additional yield which 
available. However, the Task Force believes both 
cost and resulting water rates should be given equal attent 
xxi 
Water rates include a series of cost elements: capital costs, 
transportation costs, energy costs (especially significant to 
users south of the Tehachapis} and other maintenance 
operation costs. The rates vary, accordingly, throughout 
state. The reasons for variations are numerous, r lect 
more than the fact that transportation costs vary depending on 
the point of delivery. The additional factors not r 
DWR which contribute to rate differences include varyi 
property tax policies among districts and differi district 
borrowing practices. There are also important differences in 
the amounts which some districts such as MWD pay to maintain an 
entitlement to receive State Water Project deliveries which are 
well in excess of current needs. Some districts are paying for 
entitlement water they don't need, which allows other districts 
to obtain that water at cheap surplus prices. This appears to 
be an unfair cost to many urban users, most particularly in the 
Metropolitan Water District. (When a contractor pays for 
entitlement water which is not delivered and used, 
is for capital costs, not transportation and energy costs.) 
Water rates will rise sharply in 1983 regardless of fur 
water development, due largely to expiration of DWR's 
contracts for energy purchases from public utilities. 
cost 
is 
considerable debate over what the rate of increase in ene 
costs will be up to the year 2000. Forecasts by State 
xxii 
Energy Commission public utilities differ from what s 
be applied to the State Water Project. The former use more 
the higher cost energy sources than does the California Water 
Project. One-half of DWR's energy is from hydroelectric 
generation. One of the difficulties in estimati Dh~'s future 
energy costs is its mix of proposed sources which i s 
coal, wind, geothermal, biomass, water exchanges and 
Some of these are speculative such as rice-residue-f 
plants, and solar photovoltaic applications. 
The Task Force has found no careful study of the ass ions 
and calculations made by DWR for its projected energy costs 
The contrast between the Energy Commission public utility rate 
projections and those made by DWR frre noted, however. 
The following examples are illustrative: 
PROJECTED ENERGY RATES - SWP AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 
(Cents per kilowatt hour) 
1981 1985 1990 1995 
PG&E 5.61 8.31 12.45 17.83 
So. Cal Edison 6.83 10.29 16.05 25.07 
San Diego G & E 8.30 13.18 22.94 37.25 
State Water Project .45 2.77 4.06 5.31 
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2000 
32.82 
36.54 
.56 
8.02 
The degree of disparity in energy rates merits car 
analysis. The analyses received by the Task Force from 
individual engineers and economists express the view that 
DWR projections for the State Water Project are substanti 
understated. The implications of the differences, in view 
the enormous amounts of energy required to pump and tr t 
water, are extremely significant as to water rates. DWR water 
rates reflect its energy cost assumptions. If they are too 
low, water rates will rise correspondingly. 
Water rates are estimated by DWR both in existing (1981 
dollars per acre foot, as well as inflated dollars, i.e. rates 
in future years reflecting the costs of projects sched to 
be built pursuant to SB 200. The escalated costs assume an 
interest rate, 9% yearly construction cost rises, and 7% annual 
increases for operation, maintenance and replacements. Unit 
water rates rise substantially in all SWP service areas. Unit 
rates, in excalated dollars, rise from a present rate 
per acre foot to $753 per acre foot in the Southern 
service area by the year 2000. If interest rates e 
$1 
ia 
8.5%, 
or if power costs exceed DWR projections, the increases in SWP 
unit water rates will be even more substantial. It is so 
important to note that DWR's unit costs are all "canal-si 
costs. 
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The Task Force took many hours of testimony from the State 
Department of Fish and Game (DFG) and others. One of the main 
questions concerned the fish screen which SB 200 requires to 
be tested for two years after the first stage of the Per er 
Canal is built. DFG, which supports construction of 
subject to the two-year trial period, believes the fish screen 
ultimately will work. The Task Force concludes, however, 
the uncertainties expressed by all witnesses, includi DFG, 
not warrant that conclusion. 
It would be appropriate to quote from the written statement 
and oral testimony presented to the Task Force by e U. S . 
. · 
Fish and Wildlife Service. 
"1. Screens are never as effective or iable as 
planned. 
2. Present water quality standards are i te 
to protect the fisheries of either the D ta or 
San Francisco Bay. 
3. water quality standards may be , 
in-basin fishery needs may be forgotten, as 
pressures build for greater diversions from 
Delta. 
4. Additional export from the Delta is not li y 
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to help San Francisco Bay, and it certai won 
help the Delta." 
Additional adverse comments are discussed in the Task Force 
findings in Section 4. The U. s. Fish and Wildlife Serv ce 
states that while a well designed and operated Canal 
"potential" for benefit to some species, it will be "h r sk 
activity for both fish and wildlife." It conditions ts 
guarded recommendation on the premise that the Canal not 
increase total export from the Delta to more than 5 llion AF. 
Yet the proposed export of federal and state water i n 
a dry year will be 6.7 million AF. The U.S. Fish ife 
Service certainly does not strongly endorse early construction 
of the Canal as implied by the California Water Commiss 
The California Water Commission in it's position paper on SB 
200 states, "While Delta salinity in recent years ( especi 
dry years) is significantly better than under pre-project 
conditions, the fishery is not." The Commission discounts 
claims that the Peripheral Canal "will divert more 70 
percent of the flow of the Sacramento River and thus ruin 
Delta." It does so by stating that "it is a well documen 
fact that the export capacity of the Canal is 18,250 cubic feet 
per second (CFS) - - which is therefore the maximum flow 
can be diverted. The capacity of the Sacramento River ts 
adjacent flood bypass is over 500,000 CFS in the vicini 
the proposed Canal intake. Winter flows of 50,000 to 
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100,000 CPS in the Sacramento are typical 
flows are not uncommon. 
hi 
This explanation misses the mark. The problem is not 
during flood periods. The problem exists at t s 
r 
when flow is reduced. What portion of the River will be 
then? The effect on fisheries is critical. 
The Task Force also notes that the ultimate decision as to 
whether the Canal should or should not proceed, after r s 
of millions of dollars have been spent on the Canal, 11 be in 
the hands of the Directors of DFG and DWR. It is not h 
risk for the fisheries and wildlife. It would simi 
high risk for the ratepayers who support the Canal if it were 
to be suddenly aborted in the middle of construction. The 
criteria for acceptability of operation of the screen not 
been defined and will not be defined until after the people 
vote on Proposition 9. The testimony at the Task Force 
hearings indicated that there is no fish screen in existence 
the type contemplated for the Peripheral Canal. 
The degree of risk is magnified by the fact that the screen to 
be tested at the entrance to the canal will be one-quarter 
size of the huge and unprecedented screen to be pl in 
operation. How those model results are to be to 
full size screen is not clear. A high risk method of testi a 
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high risk fish screen compounds the element of uncertai as 
to results. 
WHO PAYS AND WHO BENEFITS? 
water users in California are increasingly concerned that 
with the rising cost of water development more attention 
be paid to who pays for the water and who obtains the benefits. 
If "fairness" in this respect means that water users s 
pay, as individuals, rates which are reasonably close to 
cost of developing the water, and thus pay reasonably 
shares, there is considerable evidence that the present 
proposed system is extremely unfair. 
--
The Metropolitan Water District pays for far more SWP water 
than it presently receives. At the same time the Kern County 
Water Agency benefits from the fact that it can buy the water 
which would have been delivered to MWD as entitlement water 
from the SWP at surplus water prices of approximately $5 an 
acre foot (which must be compared with rates in some ts 
southern California which are more than 100 times that rate) 
Through 1981, the Kern County Water Agency has used 47 percent 
of the water delivered by the project but paid only 11 t 
of the total cost. 
Within MWD, moreover, there are additional disparities i 
appear to favor suburban users over residents of the Ci of 
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Los Angeles. In ur areas the extensive use 
taxes shifts the cost to small users. In the MWD the r 
tax is a major cost element of LA's high user rate. Los 
Angeles Times reported on February 10, 1982, that accordi to 
members of the LA City Council the City will MWD 
million for water, but will pay $14.6 million to MWD 
property taxes in current fiscal year. 
IS IT NECESSARY TO EXPORT MORE WATER? 
The decision on SB 200 is a "watershed" decision 
feet how and to what extent new water wi be 
California in the future. 
i 
Considering the risks and uncertainties in SB 200, is e 
w 1 
for water such that SB 200 should be approved in any case? Is 
SB 200 the best vehicle for carrying out a decision to 
the California Water Project? The best answer to 
stions involves caref review of the alterna ve 
meeting legitimate growth needs for water as 
alternatives for increased efficiency of water us 
potential for conservation and then, finally, export. It 
includes careful consideration of whether in relation to 
e 
s 
cost and benefits the Peripheral Canal or an indelta transfer 
approach is the best method of resolving problems in D 
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some increases i fici irri tion act e 
possible but not to extent which many ieve can 
achieved by expanding the current level of drip and i er 
applications, by changing from at rate water prici 
lining di example. Much water that 
in fact either colates into groundwater basins or r oins 
streams reuse downstream. Nevertheless, re are 
efficiencies in irrigation practices which can and s 
to assist in meeting future needs. 
Greater incentives to increase irrigation efficiencies 
apply water to the most productive land and cr d 
created with changes in water pricing and in the 
for improved groundwater management. While resea is 
-· 
1 imi ted, it does show that farmers consider water ices in 
making decisions as to the best use of the best land. Fair 
water pricing is not only 11 fair", it is good economics, in 
water as in other commodities or values. It 
conservation in both agricultural and urban use. 
DWR assumes that annual savings of up to 700,000 AF wate 
are possi through various wastewater reclamat 
conservation programs in the California Water Project service 
areas. Additional water supplies can be obtained ti 
surplus water in wet years for replenishment 
ins. se, toge with strong conservation measures n 
urban and agricultural usage during t scare 
XXX 
ne to t dry s. DWR st 
sibilities in inci recognizes their 
However, it tends to emphasize institutional 
riers to eir ementation. It appears to e Task Force 
t potenti ing surplus waters initiat 
conservation measures is of sufficient importance, 
in meeti sou n C ifornia water needs, that it erve 
intensive ef t documentation similar to at given 
anni 
group 
diffi t to 
water +-..... 
issues contai 
uate and 
in SB 200 are extr nari 
correct answers to 
are elusive. is is especially true of criti 
important questions relating to the need for water. 
decision on SB 200 is unquestionably a "watershed" decision 
which will shape how and to what extent new water 11 be 
developed in the future. Will Southern California San 
in Valley actually run dry or nearly dry? Or is it more a 
matter ? What alternative t-te 
conservation measures carry urban and agri tur us rs 
over e dry r ( s) • r term conservation faci t es 
or practices might si provide a long-term ance tween 
water supply and essential demand? What steps can ta to 
nate net long-term overdraft of underground ins? 
Task Force's review of the water demand forecasts ir 
assumptions, and the facts behind the ass ions have 
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convi t t s istic answers being is r 
advocates are faulty. "when the fauce s 
run dry" argument has no genuine validity or icabili to 
the SB 200 issue. S ilarly, the "conservation is the answer" 
tion to e t wi realistically wi i 
spectives. 
re is, in fact, 
term, 
our existi 
a long- term and cyclical t 
re is an expected growth in 
i to meet it. At 
re are term opportunities for reducing s 
water r at on, seepage from unlined canals 
wastage into the S ton Sea. 
There are ways to "bank" water, reprocess it, and by alteri 
the current methods of pricing water and changing to 
improve its availability and management, increase its 
and its efficient use. 
As to the dry cycle problem it is possi to make si 
insurance rams, combining use 
which is available times of shortage, 
emergency measures promoting conservation, 
water stor 
t te 
and 
overdr t 
out that ur 
contracts. 
g ter reserves. It should also in 
water use s priority over agri ture in 
xxxii 
s n re to issue of SB 200 s t 
these demand, s insurance facts in r tive 
a rational decision that finally balances cost risks 
Unfortunately, the facts are not easily determinable. But 
they can as in e of reasonable t on . 
inc reci ent state water in Southern i ia 
is MWD. At ent e district uses about 2.4 MAF 
water for urban es and 0. 6 MAF for agriculture. 
district est at demand will rise by 20 to 
3.6 MAF, of which 3.2 MAF will be urban and 0.4 MAF 11 
agri tural. Thus, MWD forecasts an increase in I 
overall, of 600,000 AF the year 2000. 
-
An examination of the assumptions underlying these est tes 
raises some questions. First, while the popu tion within MWD 
is es ti to rise by 25%, from 12 million to 15 llion 
people, the urban use of water is assumed to rise one- i 
more r , or by 33%. Is this reasonable? Due to 
factors, not least ich is the extr i cos 
i ivi suburban lings in relation to personal incomes 
tr tment condominium living s 
accellerated, th smaller individual lawn, swimming , etc. 
needs. Thus, one would logically expect smal ta 
usage rather than significan greater use. Moreover, 
legal requirements for water ficiencies incorporated into new 
i i codes and actices should reduce ta 
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cons ion. MWD anne a great new r 
properties in recent rs. Is that trend with its high 
capita water requirement likely to continue? 
believes these are legitimate questions. 
The Task Force 
economist, According to testimony from 
Bur the savings in ur 
the former MWD 
usage alone s restr ct 
grow in water requirements to 3.25 MAF, not 3.6 MAF. Bur 
so believes that if water rates were set to cover f 1 costs, 
cons ion reduced by about 15%. These factors 
reduce projected demand in MWD by 800,000 AF, more DWH 
estimate yi from the Peripheral Canal. In addition e 
could be savings from pricing and other reforms i 
reduce existing inefficiencies. 
--
Taking into account the prospective loss 
Central Arizona Project after 1985 there 
of water to 
would still 
surplus in normal years. The only problem would 
or prolonged critical dry period. MWD points out 
a dry 
if 
a 
9 
is a dry year there be a shortage. In this event s tes 
Burnham, the district could aw down its various reserves. 
still does not believe that it is lik y that both ado 
River and the California Water Project would necessari 
experience dry periods simultaneously. But if is were 
case, the reserves could be used in an insurance manner. 
could be replenished subsequently th surplus water. 
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is raises ano r f 
water be stored ra r 
issue. not 
sold at very cheap rates? It cou 
be sold at regular prices which would benefit project revenues 
and help avoid unnecessary project construction. It wou 
assist in reduci the overdraft in the San Joaquin 
Unless additional water supplies are made available to San 
in Valley, one of two things will result. Ei r 
groundwater levels will continue to drop, th cons 
increases in e cost groundwater pumping, or substanti 
acreage will be taken out of production. Some combination 
these alternatives is most likely. 
t 
A recent study by Mw~ states that 438,000 AF of water can 
saved from the Salton Sea with a number of corrective actions. 
How this can be made available for exchange or sale outside 
Imperial Irrigation District is not presently clear. But it is 
a substantial resource to be considered. 
If greater emphasis were to be placed on y 
plans, the tion remains as to whether in a 
r insurance 
or dry 
ars there are reserves in groundwater basins or surface 
storage sufficient to carry the regions in Southern and Centr 
California over the dry period. There is no doubt that re 
is a great deal of physical capacity for groundwater stor 
and there is surplus water, but it also must be recogni t 
there are significant problems in distributing water to re 
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it is In r is is a ical em, at 
same time re are legal and institutional barriers to e 
distribution and management of water. The issue is thus in 
some measure the will to make legal and institutional es 
as opposed to so heavily on a cost ineeri 
resolution of the problem. 
In addressing the concept of an insurance plan d sf 
the 1976-1977 years provide a good basis for analysis. e 
years were the driest in the State's history. 
that dry period 
conditions: 
is illustrated by the fol 
severi 
i 
- - 1977 was the driest year in California wea 
records, following the 1976 dry year. 
1977 
- - Statewide, runoff from October 1 through March 
31 was 18% of average. 
- - State water Project agricultural entit t 
water deliveries were reduced 60%. 
- - CVP deliveries were reduced to between 2 5 
normal. 
- - Groundwater use was increased to meet certain 
area needs. 
- - Agriculture, which suffered most, and under 
contracts is first to have water deliver es 
reduced, s fered from $0.5 to $1.5 bill ion in 
drought losses. 
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77 R t Governor s D t Emerg 
stated that a area could reasonably 
have a 1978 water supply capable of producing 75 g 
day per person (about half of normal minimum us 
percent 76 use governmental, cornmerci i 
rposes, a state action contingency plan would not be 
s lar , the cons ion reduction goals of Br ley 
77 Blue Ribbon Water Conservation Committee vari 
to 
5 
on increasing 
percent. 
ti severi from 10 rcent to 25 
These state and local approaches to severe drought are u 
for comparing acceptable losses and sacrifices wi the cost 
construction of additional projects. In a recent speech 
Manager of the MWD, the potential deficiency in the year 1990, 
assuming that it is as dry as the driest year in Cali nia's 
history, be on the order of 23% of normal supply to 
district. By the standards cited above is is not 
unreasonable hard ip or risk for the rare extreme d 
years. 
If Southern Californians could be assured that only 
of shortage cited by the MWD manager would be experi 
degree 
insurance risk is reasonable. is example does not f 
however, the situation whi might be experienced in 
severe drought if growth and groundwater overdr t continues. 
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is 11 extr y ri em ar a 
explanation than has been offered to date. s to 
agriculture needs caref assessment. At the same time, 
rationale for continuing surpluses and cheap water in normal 
years, no real inducement for conservation measures 
occasional dry cycles, seems unwarranted in r ation to costs. 
IVES 
Throughout the majori the Task Force hearings, 
testimony centered on SB 200 and the Peri r Can 
However, from many quarters there was insistence at 
feasible alternatives are available. As the char is 
Task Force included an investigation of possible alternatives, 
- -
extensive testimony was heard on "The Orlob Plan." This 
is an update of through-delta conveyance proposals that 
the same general concept as many other plans which utilize 
existing natural delta channels. 
Or lob is desig to accomplish the same 
the Peri Canal. current problem is t as water 
pumped out e D ta by CVP and SWP duri y i 
reverse flows are created in some delta channels, whi 
adverse effects on water quality and the fisheries. 
Specifically, Sacramento River natural flows and water r 
from project storage during dry periods now travels 
xxxviii 
sacramento Ri~er out to western of D ta. r 
it is pulled backwards by pumps around the 
tream in e San J 
S rman 
Isl in effect travels ui 
system for eventual export at Tracy. This reverse flow creates 
a pull on the more saline waters of the San Francisco Bay 
system, and water export quality and fisheries are threat 
Under the existing system, the only method of correcti s 
oblem is to release greater and greater amounts of 
"carriage" water to repel the salt water. 
resh 
The Peripheral Canal proposes to solve this reverse f 
problem by routing Sacramento River water through a new 
around the eastern periphery of the Delta. The Or P 
proposes to solve such problems by routing the Sacramento River 
water through the natural waterways in the middle and eastern 
sections of the Delta. The plan involves a short canal in the 
northern part of the Delta from the Sacramento River into 
forks of the Mokelumne River in the interior Delta. From e 
channels are widened, deepened, dr ged, 
strengthened as need to provide hydraulic 
water sou to the pumps at Tracy. 
i 
ies 
to move 
This conveyance system is designed to eliminate all reverse 
flows which require "carriage" water and hence ov 
essentially the same yield of water for export as 
Peripheral Canal. 
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Task Force d voluminous test on Or 
Plan, and although detailed anning for the plan is not as far 
along as for the Peripheral Canal, has concluded that e 
concept of the plan appears to be feasible and could more 
easily constructed. 
The Task Force has also concluded that the Orlob an 
have significant advan over a Peripheral in t 
could be constructed in a much shorter period of t 
cost substantially less, and is supported by the D ta area 
farmers who remain a serious obstacle to construction a 
Peripheral Canal. 
A drawback to the Orlob Plan, according to the Department of 
--
Fish and Game, is that the plan does not accomplish the same 
degree of benefits for fish and wildlife as the Peri ral 
Canal. However, as the Department of Fish and Game has s 
the Orlob Plan would be a significant improvement for fish 
wildlife over the continuation of the status quo. 
The Task Force is aware of the argument at reject 
Proposition 9 and the Peripheral Canal could effecti t 
water development and the completion of the State Water 
Project. This argument has been advanced as a major 
with the Orlob Plan on the grounds it has no political momentum 
or implementing authority. This is a misconception. The Orl 
an or any other through-delta facility selected by DWR was 
authorized B rns-Porter Act vote e 1 
1960. That authorization and authority still stands and 
rejection of SB 200 would not affect it. 
The Orlob an, when compared with the Per r c s a 
substantially cheaper and quicker method of conveying water 
export across the Delta. Under existing laws, 
Peripheral Canal and e Orlob an would have essenti e 
same yield. 
Task Force, therefore, concludes that the consideration of 
an alternative through-delta approach offers an tuni 
meet necessary water export requirements at substanti 
costs and shorter water delivery times, wi no dete 
--
greater environmental risks than the Peripheral Canal. 
Finally, the Task Force is not unmindful of the test 
Senator Orner Rains, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
concerning the t of legal issues inherent in nature 
issue and the special contingent features SB 200. 
may take years to resolve in both state and al cou 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
One of the elements ich makes a decision on 1 ion 
difficult is the fact that the Peripheral Canal some ot 
xli 
facilities can lt under existi law urns-Port r Ac 
even if SB 200 is defeated. So why vote? 
SB 200 and ACA 90 were intended to modify the existing 
authority to require stronger protective measures e Nor 
coast rivers, the Delta, and the San Francisco Bay r ion 
to prohibit the Legislature from reducing Delta otection A 
majority vote of the people would be needed to ch 
otections or others granted in SB 200 and ACA 90. 
th these environmental "protections", those who believe t 
the Canal will take too much water out of the Delta or t 
southern California will ultimately take increasingly damagi 
amounts, are in a difficult position. They are forced to 
believe that a negative vote on the Canal will dissuade a 
future administration from building it. But at the same time 
they risk losing the stronger, although by no means dependable, 
otective measures in SB 200 and ACA 90 in the event 
Canal is in fact built despite a no vote. 
The difficulty for persons who want to have water ted 
South is that while SB 200 mandates immediate construction of 
the Canal, there are a number of barriers which are 
substantial in nature. There are the conditions establi 
the terms of SB 200. There is the possible inability to f 
the project because the three major elements of f ing - -
xlii 
project revenue s uses, tidelands revenues reven 
- - are all questionable. 
Three conditions in SB 200 are quite possibly unattainable, at 
least for near future. SB 200 requires two agreements w 
the Federal government before the Canal can carry water e 
CVP. There must be a federal statute or a permanent contract 
to permit use of CVP water for maintenance of the water i 
standards in the Delta. However, a recent Bureau of 
Reclamation letter reaffirms the Federal position not to 
federal water to be controlled by state standards, in part 
economic reasons - - it wishes to sell the water to meet its 
contract obligations. A second required agreement prior to 
commencing construction is one which permits use of CVP water 
to meet "historical" fish levels. In view of the negative 
appraisal of the Fish and Wildlife Service of the potenti 
success of the fish screens and export effects, this may prove 
difficult. The final decision on this is, however, by 
Bureau of Reclamation, a water development agency i 
well have differing priorities than the Fish and ife 
Service. 
The questions surrounding failure to achieve an agreement on 
the wheeling of CVP water through the Canal are of si ificance 
both to those who seek environmental protections e 
seek increased water exports. There are good reasons why SB 
200 requires such a permanent agreement. It is not pr ily 
xliii 
an issue that the state will carrying f eral water at no 
cost to the latter. More important, doing so without a er 
statute or permanent contract to use that water to maintain 
Delta standards imperils the Delta standards in times of dry or 
critically dry periods and similarly imperils t 
water south. 
If the state water is required to carry the full 
maintaining quality standards in the Delta, from whi 
federal and state water have been substantially r 
placed in the Canal, the result could be disastrous to 
Delta and export interests. How can the state's f 
water in the Canal do the job of maintaining stand s 
to be 
the 
and still have more water to export south to SWP contractors in 
dry years? 
If the Canal is built it is absolutely essential that an 
agreement be reached with the federal government on use 
water to help maintain Delta standards. DWR insists 
federal government will not hold to its current 
position, and in any case proposes to transport 
ative 
water 
despite the language in SB 200 requiring an agreement ior to 
carrying water "for" the CVP, (on the grounds that it is water 
"of" the CVP). 
There is the further condition that after two years of testi 
fish screen, the Dh~ and DFG must agree that the res ts 
xliv 
will restore maintain historical fish and ldl fe 
standards. It may well be, in view of the vague definitions of 
historical levels permitted to be established by DFG, that 
these are almost certain to be approved. This is a reasonable 
assumption in view of the fact that one-half billion ars 
will have already been spent on the Canal. Such approval 
allow construction to proceed, but it does not assure e 
actual success of the fisheries features. The approval a 
dubious solution for the fish screens could well lead to s 
of adjustments to a costly and unsuccessful screen while 
salmon industry deteriorates and other species decline. On 
the other hand, if the fish screen is not approved e 
partially completed project may be both legally 
functionally inoperable within the terms and intent of SB 200. 
The Task force, after a thorough investigation, concludes that 
the State of California and the electorate cannot be assured 
that Proposition 9 (SB 200) solves the state's environmental 
problems or water needs, as they may exist with respect to 
State Water Project, in an economical and timely manner. 
total SB 200 cost and financing cannot now be defi 
certainty. The cost of water to the ultimate user cannot now 
be specifically calculated. The Task Force concludes that a 
reasonable alternative to the Peripheral Canal is available and 
can be pursued within existing authority to proceed. 
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The Task Force believes at the contents of its R t 
helpful to the voters in making an informed decision on 
Proposition 9. 
--
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on California's Water Future 
1. Th0 Task Force and the Issues 
The Task Force on Cali 
October, 1981, as 
's Water Future was 
es li of ss 
The Task Force has Senate 
and ACA 90 ( a t 
Cali a's water 
of November 1980) and how 
SB 200 provides for onal State 
lilater Project ilit sf the Per 1 Cana . 2 0 
and ACA 90 together ace substantial restrictions and 
on construction of addit 1 State Water Project s and 
State Water Project operat s. 
The 1 Canal is extreme controversial. 
diately after SB 200 and ACA 90 were enacted by 
1980, a referendum measure was qualified for 
people will vote on Proposition 9 on June R, 1982, to 
disapprove SB 200. ACA 90 will have no ef 
s 
if SB 2 
The 
or 
is 
rejected, the referendum vote is also a vote on ACA 90. There 
have been extreme di s in in format 
s and s s been particular true of 
costs and ronmental s. 
The Task Force was es lished to address quest s 
that have been raised concerning SB 200 and ACA 90 and to 
the voters with ion they can use to better iudge how 
should vote on the SB 200 referendum. The Task Force was a 
to s the need for i 1 water project deve the 
costs of water deve , who ll pav those costs, 
1 
feas il of f water l , alternat the 
SR 200 facilities, costs and benefits of those a s! 
the arlequacy of the environmental protections contained in 20 
anct ACA 90 for Northern California and Delta concerns, 
potential +-' conserva ,_lon other alterna.t s to water 
deve t proiects, and fiscal, environmental, fi s 
issues related to SB 200 alternatives. The Task Force s 
he a s of public hearings in Sacramento San sco 
Los s, Fresno, and San Diego. 
The Legislature enacted SB 200 1980 It wou 
become effective 1, 1981, if the re not 
li for ,June ballot. SR 200 is extreme licated 
ter:r1s of zation and mandates. SB 200 does 
which are all scussed at length the body of this renort: 
(1) It provides for specific State Water Project il s and 
programs, including a Peripheral Canal; (2) It aces substantia 
res ctions and conditions on construction and ion of 
those facil s; and (3) It conta s a number of sions 
d related to speci c facilit s which concern State 
Project operation and cost allocations. 
ACA 90 was approved by the voters as a re 
measure November 1980, and will become effect 
s effect. ACA 90 places in the California Constitut 
provis s SB 200 for the protection fish and 
wildlife in the Delta and Delta water rights, and s it 
fficult to develop north coast rivers. See scuss 
ACA 90 at Section 6, below. 
2 
SB 200 is often referred to as "Per 1 
Bill" since the Per ral Canal is the most controvers 1 
feature of SB 200 and would be at the heart of the state and 
federal export proiects. SB 200, however, includes many 
facilit s besides the Peripheral Canal and numerous s 
pertaining only to those other facil s. The 
also accounts for 
the facilities and 
one-fourth of the con 
1 Canal 
cost 
enumerated in SB 200, at current cost 
est s. 
The facilit s provided for SB 700 are 
lop additional water for the San Joaquin Val 
coastal areas, and Southern Ca fornia. The 
cited as prompting a demand for new water are a 
serious overdraft of groundwater basins in the San Joaqu 
and a potential major reduction in Southern California's Co 
River entitlements beginning in 1985. SB 200 envis a 
many-faceted water program along with the Peripheral Canal, 
new surface reserve s, groundwater bas 
1vater rec on, and water conservation. s s 
and 
Valley 
SR 200 ACA 90, des to protect De agriculture and 
1 concerns as well as to protect the ld to 
the , are l to SB 200's export s s. 
The Peripheral Canal was chosen as the Delta ject to 
be built because it was believed that it would best correct 
existing fishery and reverse flow prob As 'dater is 
out of the De by the Central Valley Project and State Water 
Project during dry , reverse flows are created sone 
3 
ls on 
fishe s. 
Pe 1 Canal, telv 2 
to 500 feet 2 to 30 would take water 
Sacramento r at and carry the r 
s of Delt.a to Court Trans 
water in a canal iso st lta s 
not s task of water 
north south. The in ACA 9 
measures for De 
of eventua costs, re water 
ses, dates for u del ry of water. 
The Task Force "' been as 11 
l heen spen and des 
cant unan s s about the project. T+-
-'--
of s Task Force to i both 
facts and the uncerta feature of SR ') <!. 0. 
has to obta the most i .; -'- .L sources 
to the f to tl1e cTune e ct the 
format needed to se facts 
In attempt se·s the va i the 0 
v1ater p s Force to recogn e the 
on 
but also to compare 
transfer 
potential 
ef ive 
sals. 
extent that 
conserve water a 
pro ects SB 2 
found to be 
features o 
benefits 
sed conservat 
Task Force 
of '!Vater 
c lie s, ope rat 
c, and wa use 
be 
ferable. 
si 
and le s cost 
'l'he purpose o 
to seek answers to those quest s whi best 
ner and ch dea lv 
safest 
the lea 
most ef 
assuring 
2. 
A. 
, and l 
water is avai 
Problem of 
The Federal Central Val 
Water Project (SWP) are mass projects 
ect (CVP) 
ch 
Ca i ia s' Sacramento-S 
Delta, pr to San Val 
Cali The Delta has a been a 11 
of those pro ects. 
For over 40 vears, a wavs of 
Sacramento r water past the Delta, either around 
it, have studied. The SB 200 1 Can a 
st speci c Delt? transfer plan to be 
slature ject to a popular vote. SB 0 is 
of s debate and lex se. 
5 
or 
the 
The Delta it exists is not a natura 
the 1,100 square Delta over 60 is s have been rec 
Ex tens levees been constructed and the is s 
intensively farmed. Over 700 miles of channels and s 
between the recla is nds. Water f 
San Joaquin Rivers and other tributaries moves 
channels s and is e used in the Delta, 
or f on to San Francisco 
The fresh water that flows out of the De 
salt water from San Francisco Bav. There is a 
physically available the Delta, but the qual 
s water 
of that 
s 
s 
on fresh water lows. Whatever affects Delta out 
affects Delta water quality and sal intrus 
diversions and Delta exports have steadily 
annual Delta outflow has steadi decreased. 
As early as the 1860's, proposals were made to ld 
ical barriers at various points to stop sa water s 
such barr rs have a s been rejected as too expens 
as l to fi es and navigation. Instead upstream CVP 
and SWP reservoirs have been used to release stored water 
create an "hvdraul barrier" of fresh water outflow to contra 
salinity s Delta water qual standards have been 
bv State Water Resources Control Board for the De 
requ the CVP and SWP to operate their ilities to 
releases necessary to meet the standards. The CVP has 
will not meet the standards in dry and t 
6 
years, such as 1976-1977. 
[See discussion at 2B below.] 
s question is now be 
The Sacramento River contributes a much 
proportion of flows into the Delta than the San 
and extent of saline sion has been 
greater in the San Delta than in the Sacramento Delta. 
Sal water also tends to remain the San Joaqu De 
Notinq the hydraul relationship between the two 
de s, es were made of possible ways to De 
channels to allow nore Sacramento River water to the San 
Joaquin Delta. 
Sacramento 
If no modifications had been macte, most of 
water would have had to flow the Sacramento 
River, around the end of Sherman Island and back up the San 
Joaquin River to the export pumps. 
In 1950, the CVP 4,600 CFS capaci at 
began operation. It was clear immediate that Delta was not 
a ful effective conduit to move fresh water to the CVP pumps 
In periods of low outflow, the pumps were strong to pu l 
water back Sherman Island, the westernmost Delta is 
upstream to the pumps. The San Joaquin flo"1ed 
The overall effect was to pull salt water along 
water back to the pumps. 
th the fresh 
The solution to these problems was to modi the 
existinq Delta channel configuration to make it more as 
a river than a lake bv bui Delta Cross 1 at 
Grove (30 miles south of Sacramento . The Delta Cross-Channel 
rts Sacramento water to the Mokelumne r and 
7 
s ' 30 les across the Central Delta to the 
Tracy pumps. It was constructed 1951, short after the 
pumps went into operation. It is 4,200 feet long, wi capaci 
to carry 5,000-6,000 CFS, approximately the flow of water 
required by the CVP pumps. 
Durinq the course of studving the De eros 1 
s were 
licallv iso 
qualitv San flows. The Bureau of Rec re~ecte 
precursor to the 1 Canal at t as too 
expensive to build and although it was favored 
by the Ca fornia Departnent of sh and Game (DFG). 
Study continued of methods of moving water across the 
Delta and of separating Sacramento River water from poorer 
quality San Joaquin River water and sa water. The list of 
alternatives which have been suggested over the years is 
Some plans have included flood control features. 
The SWP Burns-Porter Act was approved voter 
1960. Act not specifv what "Delta Water Pro~ect wou 
be built. Plans for Delta were incomplete in 1960 and the 
Act consequently was vague, authorizing as of 
"Master levees, control structures, l 
improvements, and appurtenant facilities in 
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta for water 
conservation, water supply in the Delta, 
transfer of water across the Delta, flood and 
salinity controJ, and related functions. 
[Water Code §12934 (d) (3).] 
Soon after the 1960 election, the of Water 
Resources (mJR) published Preliminary Edi of Bul 76, 
8 
"Delta Water Facili s. rst Bullet de 
alte s: ( ) The S le se De \.Yater ect" ch 
would have moved water to the pumps through Delta channe s th 
some channel closures to th quali 
flows, and would have subs i 
the l',Jestern De no control bene ts; { 2 
Alternative Delta Water ect" ch was a more extens 
master levees lood control the Centxa 
( 3) The " s Delta Hater Proiect" 
ex tens master levees, rea flood contra , 
control, recreat and bene i 
a t s were to " 1 
Project was not f 1 
benef s to the Proiect's flood and seepage 
control features. The S le se ect the s 
benefit-cost 
" 
DvTR' s recorrr'l.enda t s were t 
because of channel closures, and sh ldl 
ar-tong 
In e fort 0 
0 
Bureau of Reel 
Bureau of Reclamat 
and the s of rs. 
Peripheral Canal 
as il.n alternat , based on ier plans for an lically-
isolated version of the Delta Cross-Channel. 
IDC recommended construct of a Pe 
its l Plan of Deve Sacramento-San 
9 5 . The 1965 vers of a Canal would 
intake capaci 
8,000 CFS to 
channels. Over 
of 21,800 CFS to 
CVP, and to re 
10,300 CFS to 
se 3,500 CFS De 
s for the Western 
provisions would have been made to offset the 
decreased water qual the ~'lestern De A 
l 
was as benefic 1 to fisheries. The Contra Costa Countv 
Water Agency viqorous opposed the Canal, but other groups 
1 Canal at least conditiona] supported the Pe 
Opposi to a Peripheral Canal substant 1 
increased over the next 10 years. In 1969, the Bureau of 
Reclamat released a feas li report ch Dt'JR 
and ich u.s. sh & ldli Service 
tion an effie fish screen could be deve 
Bureau of Reel report 
a j SWP-CVP facilitv, 
rncommended 
th costs 
the l Canal 
In 1 7 
DHR re sed a h00-paqe draft Environmental on the 
Canal that it be a joint-use facili 
The draft Environmental Report was wide and s 
sed .. 
.10 
1975 marked the of the se 
of Delta plans. DWR sal of 
Canal and other Delta alternatives. A three-phase p 
process identi ed the 3 "most conpetitive" Delta water transfer 
+ . , LaCl.L s: ( 1) New Cross-Channel--South Delta 
Channel; (2) the New Cross-Channel--Enlarged i 
and (3) the l Canal. a 
sical facilities were studied: 5 " st channel 
a S 11 , 11 "modi channel conveyance a 
"iso 1 convevance a s", 2 " 
isolated l conveyance alternatives", and 4 " 
alterna S., n conta the 
scussed Section 7, below) is similar concept to 
these Delta a 
considered. 
s, although it was not specif 
s third phase of studv emphasized bvo 
1 J_ 
and 
equally important reasons a Delta water transfer 
facil to correct adverse 1 condi s 
present method of convey water 
the Delta for SWP and CVP and to he neet 
needs of the jects." The Peripheral Canal 
1976, was luded Senator 's SB 346 77, and 
eventually in SB 200. 
B. 
The State Water Resources Control Board 
water quality standards for the Delta which rect af 
11 
0 
ope rat of S~JP. SWRCB's standards and De ter 
quali control lan have been challenged in court. 
The SWRCB's po tion is that its water litv 
standards must be met before any water is exported De ta 
for anv purpose. The 1 CVP s general 
~eet SWRCB standards, but only as a matter of 
stated, however, that it 11 not neet standards 
tical drv vears, such as 1976-1977. This question is 
+-,_ [See scussion in Sect 5E(2), below, on the 
effect on vield of the Peripheral Canal of 
's failure to operate the CVP in 
s s. ] 
SB 200 requires the SHP to meet water quali 
standards, "including recti failure of the Un States to 
operate the federal Central Valley Project in accordance 
such standards". [Water Code§ 11460(b) .] 
The SWRCB has the statutory authoritv to set Delta 
water quality s to protect beneficial uses of Delta water 
supplies. s authori has two a s. The SHRCB s 
ret a jurisdict over SWP and CVP water s s. 
1978, the SWRCB issued Decision 1485 which CVP 
permits s permit terms and conditions sal 
control, fi ldlife protection, and to coordinate the 
different s' terms and conditions. Decision 1485 has 
challenqed in court, although s use has not been enj 
The second aspect of the SWRCB's authority is 
authority to adopt a water quality control plan (De Plan , 
1 ? J_ ,(.,J 
pursuant to federal and state water qua contra 
statutes, containing water qual standards for the 
of beneficial uses of Delta and Suisun Marsh. It s 
Delta Plan at the same it issued D-1485. DWR's of 
the SHP to complv the Delta Plan has also been chal 
court. 
The result is a single set of water qual 
that D-1485 (the water s decis ludes on the 
s from the Delta Plan " \..rhich a ect 
respons ilitv . can be D-1485 s not 
conta South De water qualitv standards for culture s 
' 
_, sdict did not appear to the SWRCB to have a rect 
on water quality conditions in the South Delta. The S~vRCB 
not have before it the CVP San Joaquin Valley permits, and i 
operation under those permits that has been a major cause of 
decreased flows and water quality degradation the San 
The SWRCB classif historical Delta benefic 
in three categor s: 1) fish and wildlife; (2 agr 
3) munic 1 and indu al uses, and establi water 
standards for each category. The standards c ustments 
in water quality for fferent hydrologic condi ons exper 
fferent tvpes of water vears. 
The "under orinc le" of the Decis 148 
standards is that: 
" . water quality the Delta shollld_ be 
at least as good as those levels ch would 
13 
have 1 
ects not been constructed, as 
the con tutional mandate of reasonab 
use." 
And, of "controll " to SNRCB's water r 
decision and Bas Plan is De Protect Act 
De Protect 1 01, 
affirms ce of an 
culture, 
Delta and "to a source of fre 
to areas of water ficiencv. " 
for the De and an a 
is made a of the 'l'he Act. dec 
policy no water ll from l 
which th are t I it i 
lie st to tute overland water suppl s 
Delta users l of sal contra f n 
f ial burden sha l be laced upon s Delta users 
so rtue f such sub 
the basic Delta tion 
In D-1485, the SWRCB 
of water from 
any purpose." 
F 
other 
14 
The SWRCB asserts the D-1485 s s must 
rna tained as f st ope rat c teria for anv 
iects or parts thereof that may he constructed and 
the s" subiect to SWRCB jurisdi It must be 
noted, aga , that both D-1485 and the De Plan are be 
cha numerous law s. 
The SWRCB D-1485 water 
for fi and 
levels of 
iqation of 
ldlife do not re-e 
ion Delta fi s 1 s 
ect s on all fishery 
the 1 down of the project 
s 
However, SWRCB concluded that D-1485 provides a rea 
1 f l determinations are made level of protect 
concerning a cross-De transfer facility or means to 
iqate project impacts." 
SWRCB representatives explained at a Task Force 
that the SWRCB's present standards don't take Pe 
Canal account. 1"'7hen the SviJRCB opened its De 
1976, it was uncerta Delta transfer il DWR 
Bureau of Reclamation would dec to ld. SWRCB 
con decided to develop a "near-term plan" to 
develop standards. The Peripheral Canal would 
substantial change interior Delta flow patterns and 
will have to re-evaluate s standards if the Per 1 Cana 
lt. The D-1485 hearings will he reopened 
if necessary. 
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1986 or r 
3. D\I'JR Is Canal 
The provis s of SB 200 do not ss 
scale of the Peripheral Canal facilities to be lt. 
Bulletin 132-81 provides DWR's sties on the 
Cana . The Cana would be an unlined tch, approx 
, around the eastern edae of the Delta 
scr 
mvR 
l 
Cli Court SB 200 requires it be bui t 
s s: 1 Hood to Tract (2 les) 
Stage 2 "preconsol II (preparing the l 
froP1 the San in to Clifton Court and 
Stage 3 completion of the Canal from Tract to the 
(18 les). DWR now est s that 1 ll be como 
operational by 1989, and 3 1994. 
The Canal would be between 400 and 500 feet and 
between 20 and 30 feet deep. Rights-of-way to 6,570 acres would 
have to be acquired, 13 roads and 1 railroad 1 wou have to 
be relocated, and other utilities such as Moke 
would be affected. 
s would be constructed to carry Canal water 
the natural watercourses would cross. S s 
25 feet 25 feet cross-sections would be lt at the 
630 feet ong), sappointnent Slough (540 feet 
the San Joaquin River-Stockton Ship Channel (800 feet 
sl SP1aller siphon (22~ feet by 22~ feet cross-
would be needed at Old 
The capaci 
Hood would be 21,800 
(500 feet ) . 
of the intake from the Sacramento 
c feet per second (CFS). Fourteen 
16 
release points a the Canal would have a s cal capac: 
release a totaJ of 9,800 CFS, 5,600 CFS along the first 24 le 
stage, 4,200 CFS along the remaining 18 miles. (Although there 
would be the physical capacitv to release 9,800 CFS, DWR could 
release only 6,300 CFS at l export pumping rates. 
The Hood punping plant would be stalled 2 
TIIITO units, with 5,450 CFS combined capacitv, ltlOuld be 
stalled coniunction with construction of 1 of 
Canal. Six additional ing units would be added at 
of the entire Canal, to reach the u te planned 21,8 0 CFS 
capacity. 
A fi screen would be instal at the Hood 
Stage 1 of the Canal would be operated for two s "to 
establish adequate fish screen and operation criteria." The 
final 18 miles of the Canal ·would be completed onlv v1hen 
Directors of DWR and DFG "both determine from the resu s of the 
trial period that the fish screen and operational teria l 
adequate protect fish populations". 
The fish screen that will be tested dur the 2 
al period would have a 5,450 CFS capac The of 
the fish screen the completed Canal would have a 21, 0 CF 
capaci , nearly four times the capacity of screen 
would be tested for two years. rThe fish screen is discussed 
more detail at Sect 8B, below.] 
DWR estimates that since 1963, it has $20 1 
on planning and des related to the Peripheral Canal and an 
additional $42 million on Delta planning in general. DWR has 
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completed all prel rv d s work, luili 
mapping of Canal alignment, and preliminarv contact wi 
affected utilities. It is ready to begin final des work and 
contract drawings. DWR expects to be able to handle all 
problems involved, including cons of 
siphons. DWR plann will include provisions for 
and stantial recreational use of the Canal area. 
4. The Fi s Questions 
The ope of the SWP and CVP, icu 
export of water out of the Delta, has contributed 
to the decline of fish and wildlife resources. Pro ect 
operation has reduced the outflow of fresh water 
at some times of the year and has changed the veloci and 
direction of flow in Delta channels during some times of 
year. DFG has stated that the present project opera 
satisfactory for fish and wildlife in the Delta. 
is not 
The Department of Fish and Game uses the magn of 
to striped bass to estimate general damage to fi s. 
DFG has determined that strioed bass survival between 1968 
1976 has averaged onlv about 60% of "recent hi l 
(estimated 1922-1967 average)", and that this decrease 
survival is <'l.ue to a "combination of the divers s 
South Delta and sometimes inadequate fresh water outflows. 
DFG reported to the SWRCB in 1981, that there are 
additional factors which are affecting the abundance of vounq 
striped bass in the Delta. DFG has determined that voung 
bass populations s 1976 have been we~l below the levels 
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1 
been cted. ict s were based on 
relat ship between flow and population used to set DeJ.ta Basi 
Plan standards. The new factors include "phvsical effects" 
(flows, diversions, tenperature, etc.), food supply, egg 
production, ~ortal rates (fishing and non-fishing), and 
pollutants. DFG is investigating these new factors further. 
The u.s. sh & Wildlife Service agrees with DFG 
there are serious adverse effects on fisheries resulting from 
cross-Delta water transport: 
11 Pumping confuses migratory sh by revers 
stream flow. The pumps draw ~uvenile fishes 
out of Delta waterways. As many as 80 
llion young striped bass are lost annually 
as are 6.5 1 salmon and 4 million to 5 
mill shad. In addition, the salinity 
reg of the Delta has been altered, causing 
habitat changes of immense proportions in an 
area that serves as nursery and rearing 
habitat for many of the fishes that are 
harvested throughout the state . " 
The DFG and the U.S. Fish & 'V7ildlife Service compose 
the main fisherv agencies for the state and federal government 
and have both expressed positions on the Peripheral Canal. The 
has position that: 11 A Peripheral Canal, 
proper s , effie ly screened, and operated in 
c 
accordance cr ia developed hy fishery scientists, has the 
al to improve existing conditions in the Delta certa 
spec s of fish." 
The Service ises, however, that its endorsement must 
he considered in light of what it refers to as "real world 
facts": 
"1. Screens are never as effective or 
rel le as planned. 
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2. Present water qual s rds are 
inadequate to protect the fisheries of either 
the Delta or San Francisco Bav. 
3. Water ouality standards may be reduced, 
and in-bas fishery needs may be forgotten, 
as pressures build for greater diversions 
from the Delta. 
4. Additional export from the De is not 
l ly to help San Francisco Bay, and 
certain won't help the Delta. 
5. There 11 be impacts, not neces 
benefic l, associated with developing the 
additional water for export south of the 
De 
6. There ll be 
associated vli th 
munic 
San 
resulting from 
Delta. 
impacts, adverse, 
sed agricu l, 
al developrrtent 
Los Angeles Bas 
exports frorrt the 
7. 1 exports south of the De 
will generate more dirtv drain water coming 
back to the Delta." 
The Service's conclusion is that increased De 
exports, which will be facilitated by building Peripheral 
Canal, will be "high risk activity for both fish and ldlife". 
The Peripheral Canal could be an improvement over present 
svstem or any other cross-De facilitv 11 if is not used 
export more than 5 Ilion acre-feet of water annual from the 
Delta", but if exports are increased above current ls, the 
potential benefit of Peripheral Canal will be reduced. Even 
though actual current exports are in excess of 5 ll 
acre-feet now, the Service has stated that the Canal wou 
better than a "non-isolated facilitv". 
DFG believes the PeripherAl Canal vrill improve De 
fisheries, and will provide more improvement than anv through 
7.0 
Delta ltcrnat isolat watE~r for from 
estuarv and redi ing Delta inflow bv re s wat.er 
the Canal into the interior Delta, reverse "upstream" f in 
Western and Southern Delta channels except Middle River would be 
eliminated and downstream flow directions would be re 
[See discussion at Section 7E, below.] DFG also bel a 
Peripheral Canal would protect Delta nursery area d 
bass other fish. The export pumps would no longer sh 
out of natural migration routes or reduce 
popu s in the Delta. 
sh that spawn above the proposed Per 1 Cana 
at Hood create a problem which poss can be 
only by limitations on diversions at certain t s of the year 
A large maiority of the striped bass, salmon, steelhead, 
sturgeon, and shad spawn above the Peripheral Canal intake, and 
their young migrating down the Sacramento River may be too small 
rnigrating str bass young would pass the screens less 
rtv days and that substan al reductions in water 
dur time would be a feasible means of protecting 
It bel s a screen could be constructed at the intake to 
young salmon and shad out of the canal. [See scuss of the 
fish screen at Section 8B, below.] 
DFG has taken the position in the past that 
fish screen studies should be made before the Peripheral Canal s 
lt. SB 200, however, allows Stage 1 to be built before 
testing is completed. The serious situation that would exist •.,;;: l.L 
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DFG were to that the screen was not after the 
fish screen had been tested in place for 2 vears a Stage 1 
was built is discussed in Section 8B. 
DFG has also analyzed non-isolated cross-Delta 
conveyance systems which are alternatives to Per l 
Canal. DFG contends that all of the non-isolated systems would 
be better than the status guo, but would only 1 
present .;:· _,_l ry problems. According to DFG, through-De 
a 
ives would improve some flow reversal prob , but would 
not care of reverse flow problems South Delta, and 
could create higher velocities in Delta channels. However, DFG s 
ana sis does not appear to take into cons the 
areas with continuing reverse flows comprise only a small 
percentage of South Delta areas and that even the entire South 
Delta area comprises on a small part of the fisherv resources 
of the Delta as a whole. 
The DFG conclusion that the Peripheral Canal is the 
preferable De facili recognizes that the Canal could be 
built but not ooerated in a way to protect fisheries. The 
Peripheral Canal will protect fish and wildlife only 
adequate water quality and flow standards and the construct of 
'"I'he Peripheral Canal . . , in combination 
with facil ies for the Suisun Marsh and 
adequate water qual and inflow standards, 
could restore the maior fish and wildlife 
resources nearly to storical levels." 
It is important to note that SB 200 requires that 
Peripheral Canal construction not begin until DWR and DFG enter 
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an for fish and ldlife 
agreement must provide for the restoration of adult populations 
of fish and wildlife at "historical levels", the ~aintenance of 
"historical levels" (apparently regardless of circumstances) , 
must for the realization of the potential of pro ect 
for increasing fish and wildlife resources above cal 
levels. screpanc s between that statutory and 
to which official statements reflect an 1 even to 
restore hi al levels are discussed in Sect SH. 
5. SB 2 0 0 
A. Creation of the SB 200 Package - What It Includes 
The provisions of SB 200 are not pre in the bill 
itself facility-by-facility. It is consequently difficult to 
evaluate quickly all the conditions and restrictions involved. 
SB 200 is su~arized below by facility to the extent possible, 
with references to the section numbers in SB 200 in brackets. 
Peripheral Canal [11255(a)] 
1. The Peripheral Canal will be a 42-rnile man-made 
channel around the eastern and southern rim of De 
will inc canals, pumping plants, intake and outlet 
structures, s and fish screens. It is to be 
constructed stages, with stages 1 and 2 
concurrently. Stage 1 is construction of the actual Canal 
from the town of Hood on the Sacramento River to Shima Tract 
near Stockton. Stage 2 will be "pre-consol " from 
San Joaquin River to Clifton Court Forehay. Stage 3 11 
consist of completion of the Canal from Shima Tract to 
Clifton Court Forebay. [11255(a)] 
2. i'Jhen stage 1 is completed, it must be operated 
a 2-year period "to establish adequate fish screen and 
operational criteria." Stage 3 will only be con 
"when the rector of Water Resources and the rector of 
Fish and Game both determine from the results of the 1 
period that the fish screens and operation criteria 
adequately protect fish populations." [11255(a)] 
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3. DWR is requ 
"prerequis act ies" 
to complete des work and other 
and commence construction as soon 
as possible. [11256(b)l 
4. Before construction can begin, m'm and DFG must 
enter into a permanent agreeMent to provide for "the 
restoration and maintenance of all adult populations of fi 
and wildlife at historical levels in the Delta and 
Suisun Marsh and San Francisco Bav System." The 
agreement must include "those limitations on exports and 
diversions to storage which are necessary to restoring and 
rna ining storical levels of fish and wildlife." 
agreement must also provide for "the realization of the 
potential of the project increasing [fish and 
wildlife] . resources above . . [historical] ls 
. . consistent with the contracts for water delivery and 
With Other purpOSeS Of the pr0j eCtS • II [ 1125 6 (a) ] 
5. Before constructions can begin, an 1 
impact report on the Peripheral Canal must be prepared which 
must include an evaluation of possible impacts of 
Peripheral Canal on Sacramento River "mineral, nutrient, 
biological components." [11258] 
6. The Suisun Marsh facilities must be completed 
before Stage 1 of the Canal is completed [11255(e)]. The 
South Delta Water Quality Improvement Facil ies must be 
completed before the Peripheral Canal is completed. 
[11255 (d)] 
7. DWR may provide for joint use of the Peripheral 
Canal with local agencies or with the United States upon 
execution of s concerning operation, financing, and 
sharing of benef of the Peripheral Canal unit. 
[11255(a)] With certain exceptions [11458 )] , federal 
project use of the Canal is additionally conditioned on a 
permanent federal-state agreement for the coordinated 
operation of the federal and the state projects, compl 
by the United States with state water quality standards and 
water rights conditions, and a permanent federal-state 
agreement for fish and wildlife restoration and maintenance. 
[11458 (a)] 
Contra Costa Canal Intake Relocation [11255(b)] 
1. Relocation is subject to the terms of a contract 
between DWR and the beneficiaries. [11255(b)] 
Los Vaqueros Unit [11255(c)] 
1. To be located 8 miles west of Cli 
Forebav, in Contra Costa Countv. [11?55(c)] 
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Court 
2. "Other offstream storage reservoirs" pass 
with location at the scretion of the DWR Director. 
r 11255 (c)] 
3. Authorization is conditional upon completion of 
engineering, economic, environmental, and financial 
feasibility reports acceptable to DWR. [11?57] 
South Delta Water Quality 
Improvement Facilities [11255(d)] 
1. To be completed no later than the Peripheral 
Canal. [ 112 55 (d) J 
2. Facil ies unrelated to Peripheral Canal 
construction or operation to be constructed only if a 
DWR-water agency contract is executed. [l1255(d)] 
3. To lude pumping plants, discharge canals, flovJ 
control structures, channelization of sloughs to 
South Delta water quality, circulation, and distribution, 
and may include facilities and/or exchange arrangements to 
deliver water to the San Joaquin River via the federal 
Delta-Mendota Canal. [11255 (d)] 
Suisun Marsh Facil ies [11255(e)] 
1. To be completed no later than stage 1 of the 
Peripheral Canal. [11255(e)] 
2. DWR to construct, maintain, and operate protection 
facilities to mitigate for adverse impacts of reduced Delta 
outflows on Suisun Marsh wildlife resources (or contract for 
same with Suisun Resources Conservation District) pursuant 
to a jo Suisun District-DWR-Fish and Game plan. 
[11255 (e)] 
3. DvJR must enter into a permanent and enforceable 
contract with the Suisun District. f11456] 
Groundwater Storage Facilities [11255(f)] 
(1) South San Francisco Bay Area 
(2) San Joaquin Valley 
(3) Southern California 
(4) Enlarged East Branch California 
Aqueduct and Devil Canyon Power 
Plant 
1. To provide estimated 400,000 acre-feet per year 
vield. [11255 (f) 1 
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2. 
water for 
[11255(f) 
To capitalized cost of del 
lling or refilling groundwater storage space. 
3. None of facilities are to be constructed or 
operated within a SWP contractor's boundaries except by 
contract. [11255 (f)] 
4. Authorization is conditional upon comp of 
engineering, economic, environmental, and financial 
feasibilitv reports acceptable to DWR. [11257] 
Glenn Reservo -River Diversion Unit [11255(g)] 
1. To be located near Stony and Thomes Creeks on the 
west side of the Sacranento Valley, and can be constructed 
stages. [11255(g)] 
2. Authorization is conditional upon comp ion of 
engineering, economic, environmental, and financial 
feasibility reports acceptable to DWR. [11257] 
DNR has recently decided to defer further study of a 
full-scale Glenn Reservoir. Instead, it has identified a smal 
project called the Thomes-Newville Unit, which is not included in 
SB 200. Thomes-Newville would develop surplus local runoff of 
Stony Creek and Thomes Creek. Construction of Thomes-Newville 
would not prevent later building the Glenn Reservoir for 
off stream storage of Sacramento River water. DVJR now st.ates that 
further analysis of the Glenn Reservoir-River Diversion P 11 
be considered only as an alternative to enlarging Shasta 
Reservoir. [See discussion at Section SF, below, of what 
actually will be built if Proposition 9 passes.] 
Colusa Reservoir-River Diversion Unit (11255(h)] 
1. Authorized only if Glenn Unit is not feas 
[11255(h)1 
2. To be located in the western portion of Glenn and 
Colusa Counties. [11255 (h)] 
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3. Authorization is conditional upon tion of 
engineering, economic, environmental, and financial 
feasibility reports acceptable to DWR. [11257] 
Hastewater Reclamation Programs [11255(i)] 
1. Undefined facilities authorized if "economica 
competitive with alternative new water supply sources." 
[11255(i)) 
2. None of facilities are to be constructed or 
operated within a SWP contractor's boundaries except by 
contract. [112 55 ( i) l 
Hater Conservation Programs [11255(j)] 
1. Programs to be within SWP contractor's boundaries. 
[11255(1)] 
2. Implementation contingent on DWR contracts th 
SWP contractors. rl1255(j)] 
3. Wastewater reclamation and urban conservation 
contractor areas estimated to total 700,000 acre-feet 
year by year 2000. [11255(j)] 
Mid-Valley Canal Unit [11255(k)] 
1. Construction primarily to alleviate groundwater 
overdraft and to serve waterfowl management areas. 
[11255(k)] 
2. Repayment of full state costs required. fll255(k) 
3. ~'7ater delivered to the unit must be delivered 
through the Peripheral Canal but cannot be SWP water. 
[11255 (k)] 
4. Authorization is conditional upon comp of 
engineering, economic, environmental, and financial 
feasibility reports acceptable to DWR. [11257] 
5. Before construction can begin, D'i'lR and DFG must 
enter into a permanent fish and wildlife agreement. 
[11256 (a)] 
Western Delta Overland Water Facilities [11255(e)] 
1. To supply water to agricultural areas on Sherman 
Island, Jersev Island, Hotchkiss Tract, and adjacent areas. 
(11255(e)] 
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Water Transportation Facilities for 
Federal CVP Water to Alameda and 
Contra Costa Counties [11255(m) (a)] 
SB 200 also includes a number of provisions concerning 
SWP operation generally which are not tied to particular 
facilities: 
Contracts with Specified Delta Water 
Agencies [11456] 
1. DHR must enter into permanent and enforceab 
water rights and water quality contracts with eight water 
agencies and districts in the Delta. The contracts must 
recognize the rights of Delta users to use Delta waters and 
must establish minimum water quality criteria. The qual 
must be adequate to permit the preservation of present Delta 
agricultural, domestic, and environmental uses. [11456] 
2. Contract water rights and water quality criteria 
must be met before water can be exported from the Delta. 
[11456] [See also 11460(b)] 
3. Delta water users must make reasonable payment 
net water supply and qualitv bene ts received from the SWP 
and CVP, offset by any detriments caused bv the project. 
fll456] [See also 11457] 
4. If contracts are not entered into by the t 
SB 200 becomes effective, differences must be reso 
the request of either party by binding arb 
contracts are made covering ?/3 of the total De 
Suisun Marsh area within the listed Delta agencies, 
party can withdraw from arbitration. [11456] 
at 
After 
either 
DWR has entered into contracts with two agencies, the 
North Delta Water Agency and the East Contra Costa Irrigat 
District. 
5. DWR must operate the S"~dP in compliance with water 
quality standards set forth as conditions in water s 
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permits 
establi 
and licenses in 
by contract. 
water li control plans, or as 
11460(b)] 
Allocation of Costs Related to 
Specified Benefits [11457, 11915.21 
1. The costs of provid net bene 
water 
contractors 
s to Delta 
agricultural, mun 1, and users 1 l _j_ _;.._ 
not be re any SWP not 
receive those [ 1145 7 
2. The costs allocable to water to 
sate for hi upstream s and s 
which have reduced Delta, sun Marsh, and San Francisco 
water quality, fish and ldlife, and 11 
not be re sable by anv lie agenc 
SWP water suppl s. 
1. The SWP must be 
qua ity standards water 
water quali control p s, 
2. 
the U.S. to 
standards, p 
Uncodi s 
the 
and contracts. 
10 zes DFG to 
between Delta outf and waste 
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SB 2 0 -· IJhat Cost 
1. Cost Estimates. 
Vastly different cost estimates foi SB 200 and the 
Peripheral Canal have been cited. Different cost estimates cover 
different faci s, some estimates are in present-day 1 
values, some are escalated ("inflated") dollar va s, 
has what luded in its estimates (such as f 
and bond interest) and the projected construction period. Cost 
e s current dollars show what a facility would cost if 
all costs were incurred immediate Cost est s 
inflated, escalated dollars show what a facil is to 
cost when the construction is scheduled to occur. Over st 
five years, DWR has prepared cost estimates for SB 346 
facilit s, for SB 200 facilities (which are not precisely the 
same as SB 346 facilities), and for the Peripheral Canal. 
Two frequently cited figures are $23 billion and 
$11.63 billion. These two figures come from DWR's Bullet 132 
ser s. The $23 llion figure, from Bul 132-79, is an 
est of the esca cost of the entire SWP from 1952 until 
2035, exc interest cost, but including $2.67 bill for 
facilities which have already been built and some 
facil s not included in SB 200. The $23 billion f is 
relevant to the State's financial capacity to support longer-term 
water development in relation to other long-term cap 1 
requirements such as highwavs, housing, and solid waste 1. 
The $23 billion figure does not, however, represent SB 200 costs. 
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In the 1980 sion and of its Bulle 
132 se s on current SWP activities and future management plans, 
DWR decided to restrict future cost estimates to the year 2000 
instead of the year 2035. Bulletin 132-80 consequently d 
a reduced est of $10.1 billion for the total esca co 
exclusive of interest cost, of the entire SWP for the years 1952 
to 2000. In 1981, DWR re-estimated the entire SWP costs from 
952 to 2000, to be $11.63 billion, not including interest costs. 
No cost f s for the years 2001 to 2035 are given, a 
obligations continue to the year 2035. 
The slative Analyst prepared a report on 
SB 200 costs the Legislature July 1, 1980. The s 
used report at the time SB 200 was enacted. It the 
then current DWR estimate of what SB 200 will cost. The report 
warned that it is not possible to arrive at a precise for 
the total cost of SB 200, and estimated that SB 200 would cost 
$4.330 billion 1979 dollars) "plus unknown added costs". 
See table, below.] 
cost was based on " sed data" from DWR's 1978 of 
lletin 76. Bulletin 76 assumed federal participat 
sufficient capacity to meet both federal and state needs. The 
s Analvst's report noted that it might be poss le that 
the total project cost could be reduced if the federal t 
did not and if the facilities were redes to meet 
on state needs: "However, the bill has no provision 
any facil ies would be smaller and less costly should 
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l not be available." SB 200 facilities, 
the Peripheral Canal, have not been redesigned to meet state 
needs only, and, in fact, federal CVP water may be delivered 
through the Canal to Clifton Court, whether the federal 
cipates or not. [See discussion at Sect 8C 
below.] 
The report of the Legislative Analyst which ll 
the voter ballot pamphlet used the figure of $3.1 
billion for total cost of SB 200. Use of that figure was 
chal Superior Court, and the Court held that the 
ballot ion was misleading. The most significant change 
made by Court was in the ballot title and summary 
ch will now state: 
"Potential construction costs at 1981 prices 
are in excess of $3.1 billion plus unknown 
additional costs, plus interest, to be 
financed by increased user charges." 
DWR's most current estimate of the total cost of 
SB 200 provided to the Task Force is based on formation in 
Bul 132-81. DWR's present estimate is $5.38 billion all 
SB 200 facil ies {also plus unknown added costs), inc 
$1.289 billion for the Peripheral Canal (see table, below}. 
These estimates are in escalated dollars, but do not inc 
interest costs. DWR has also estimated these costs in 1981 
dollars and 1981 price levels as $2.457 billion for all SB 200 
facilit s to be built by the year 2000 and $680 million for 
Peripheral Canal only. The assumptions used by DWR 
calcu inq escalated costs will be considered below. 
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DWR has specifically requested that the Task Force 
include mvR's comments on the relative nature of escalated cost 
figures. An in-house DWR memorandum contains such a statement: 
"Many people are confused (if not 
overwhelmed) by the magnitude of the figures 
resulting from escalation due to inflation. 
There is an inevitable tendency to think of 
year 2000 escalated cost figures in terms of 
1982 dollars. Perhaps this can be put in 
better perspective by looking back 18 years 
stead of ahead. In 1964, for instance, the 
price of a nice car was in the $3,500-$4,500 
range and a 3-bedroom, 2-bath house was 
perhaps $26,000. Now, 18 years later, in 
1982, the comparable car is about 
$8,000-$10,000 range. Fortunately, however, 
we don't have to buy at 1982 prices with 1964 
dollars; dollars aren't the same either. 
As prices rose from 1964 to 1982, there was a 
corresponding increase wages. Similarly, 
vear 2000, with inflation there will be a 
lot more dollars to pay those year 2000 
prices." (Undated memorandum "Senate Bill 
200/Peripheral Canal Costs".] 
The following table compares cost estimates used 
by the Legislative Analvst with DWR cost estimates in both 1981 
and escalated dollars: 
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DWR slative Analyst Report 
SB 200 Construction Cost Estimates 
(in millions of dollars) 
Facil ies 
Legislative 
Analyst's Report 
(1979 dollars) 
Peripheral Canal 
[No separate costs 
given for 3 stages] 
offstream storage 
reservoirs] 
South De vJater 
Quality Improvement 
Facilities 
Suisun ~1arsh 
Facilities 
Groundwater Storage 
East Branch 
Enlargement 
Glenn Reservoir 
Unit 
$600 
$25 
$720 
$30 
$35 
$226 
$150 
$2,000 
Themes-Newville No estimate 
Western De $17 
Overland Facilit s 
Mid-Vallev Canal $645 
Unit 
DWR Bulletin 
132-81 (1981 
dollars) 
$680 
$27 
$872 
$36 
$60 
$112 
$161 
No estimate 
$493 
$16 
No estimate 
DWR Bulletin 
132-81 (escalated 
dollars) 
$1,289 
$62 
$1,894.7 
$87 
$69.5 
$265.8 
$274.9 
No est 
$1,406.1 
$28.8 
No estimate 
Total *$4.443 billion *$2.457 billion *$5.378 bill 
*The Legislative Analyst's Report states that s 
$4.443 billion is "plus unknown added costs". DWR's $2.457 
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11 and $5.378 bill estimates do not include est s for 
Glenn Reservoir, which the Legislative Analyst estimated to be $2 
billion in 1979 dollars or for the Mid-Valley Canal Unit, which 
the Analyst estimated to be $645 million in 1979 dollars. 
The Legislative Analyst's $3.1 billion figure which 
ll be used in the voter's ballot pamphlet adds to DWR's $2.457 
billion $633 million for the cost in 1981 dollars of the 
Mid-Valley Canal. 
No cost estimates have been provided for any of 
other SB 200 facilities, including: 
Colusa Reservoir Unit 
Wastewater Reclamation Programs 
Water Conservation Programs 
Water Transportation Facilities to Termini 
of San Joaquin, San Francisco, and San 
Mateo Counties 
Water Transportation Facilities for CVP 
Water to Alameda and Contra Costa Counties 
No costs are estimated for mandated studies, for costs of 
benefits to Delta users and of providing water to compensate for 
historic upstream diversions which are not reimbursable by SWP 
contractor::;, for the provision that the SWP must be operated to 
meet water quality standards whether the CVP is operated to meet 
the standards or not, for projected $1.5 billion added costs of 
local distribution facil ies, or for power generating 
facilities. DWR's figures continue to assume that the Peripheral 
Canal will be sized to carry £ederal water. No cost estimates 
are given for ACA 90. 
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2. Assumctions made regarding construction 
_::;c_!leduling, costs, and inflation over the 
construction ceriod. 
DVJR's cost estimates must be analyzed in terms of 
the underlying assumptions. Analysis must include basic 
construction costs and projected construction schedules, 
flation, and interest rates. 
The construction schedule for SB 200 facilit s 
has been changed numerous times. Changes in the schedule 
rectly affect total escalated cost figures. The following is 
DWR's most recent construction schedule, which it calls its t 
opt stic schedule": 
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Facility Construction Per 
Peripheral Canal 1983-1988 
Stage One 
Peripheral Canal 1986-1992 
Stage Two 
Peripheral Canal 1988-1993 
Stage Three 
Suisun Marsh Protection 1981-1984 
South Delta Water 1988-1994 
Quality Improvement 
Relocate Contra Costa 1988-1994 
Canal Intake 
Western Delta Overland 1985-1990 
Facilities 
Los Vaqueros Reservoir 1985-1995 
Groundwater Storage 1983-2000 
East Branch Enlargement 1983-1989 
Thomes-Newville 1985-1993 
DWR has also estimated costs on a year-by-year basis for the 
$5.378 billion construction cost esti~ate, exclusive of interest: 
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Amount 
Year (mill s 
1981 4.3 
1982 20.5 
1983 54.8 
1984 56.9 
1985 60.6 
1986 151.6 
1987 382.5 
1988 670.8 
1989 453.9 
1990 4 71.7 
1991 645.8 
1997. 794.5 
1993 687.8 
1994 553.1 
1995 311.1 
1996 57.7 
1997 0. 1 
1998 0.1 
1999 zero 
2000 zero 
5,378.0 
DHR's escalated costs assume an annual f 
rate of 9% for construction prices, 7% for state salaries, and 
10% for land acquisition over the period 1981-2000, but do not 
include interest costs. 
3. Bond interest costs are not included in DWR cost 
estimates. 
Interest costs on bonds sold to finance 
portion of the funding of SB 200 cannot be obtained from pro ect 
revenue or tidelands income must be added to estimated 
construction costs. The interest costs of bonds are diff lt to 
forecast with precision, but are very significant. 
DWR has not included interest costs in its $5.378 
billion estimated cost of SB 200, although it calculates and 
publishes interest cost figures in its bulletins based on the 
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as that $2.297 bill revenue bonds ll have to be 
sold to f SB 200 construction. DWR is now st 
it may be able to build the Peripheral Canal and other SB 200 
facilities on a "pav-as-you-qo" basis, without selling any bonds. 
The Task Force believes that DWR's "pay-as-you-go" calcu s 
mav be incomplete, and any case would only ft bond st 
costs to local districts and froM SB 200 facilities to non-SB 2 0 
facilit s. [See discussion of "pay-as-you-go" f 
SC, below.] 
DWR bel s that rest costs should not 
the cost projection of SB 200, but should be refle 
ing 
water rates. The Task Force, however, sagrees. It bel 
voters should be informed of the total cost of SB 200, 
including both construction and bond interest, as well as 
projected water rates. 
Normally, when the electorate votes on state bond 
s 
issues, the Legislative Analyst describes the ballot pamphlet 
both ect purposes and the total estimated cost of the 
proposed ssue, including principal and interest for 
ll term of the bond issue. SB 200 presents an unusual case 
s DIJR has s been given general authority to issue 
revenue bonds, and not l specific projects are approved does 
this interest cost become a definite amount. Because potential 
bond costs are created by project approval by the vote on 
Propos ion 9, it is appropriate that the total cost should be 
identified in the usual manner for a vote on a bond issue. 
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At the sane time, because the people will be vot to 
impose costs upon those who will pay for the water, the general 
public should not onlv be told the total cost of projects, but 
also what the rates for payment are expected to be. SB 200 was 
not an appropriations bill and was not subject to the 2/3 vote 
irement, despite its being (except for the omnibus budget 
bill) the st cost bill ever. This heightens the need for 
describ the full cost of measure for public cons 
a referendum. 
DWR estimates that approximately $2.297 billion of 
revenue bonds will have to be issued to finance SB 200 
il s. Calcu ion of rest costs for $2.297 bill 
revenue bonds depends on the bond interest rate, the 
rate, and the term of the bonds. 
scount 
of 
DWR assumes an 8~% annual interest rate and a bond term 
of 40 years for future supplemental water revenue bonds, and an 
8~% rate and 20 year period for future water bonds. DWR 
calculates that SB 200 interest costs, based on an 8~% st 
rate to the end of the bond repavment periods, will be 89.4% of 
total SWP interest costs, or $7.2 billion. If this interest cost 
is added to the $5.3 billion construction cost estimate, the 
total cost of SB 200 is about $12.5 billion. The interest cost 
would be less if the bond term were shorter or greater if the 
rest rate were r. 
While an 8~% rate is higher than previous DWR revenue 
bond issues, it is low compared with current bond rates. A more 
nearly comparable current rate would be 12% or higher. The 
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representat from Dil , and Co., Inc., DWR s 
sor, stated that 8~% was selected because that was the l 
maximum on water revenue bonds. That rate does not reflect an 
accurate or realistic assessment of what the market will 
In the event that current bond interest rates continue to over 
12%, the cost of the projects in SB 200 would rise sharp to 
over $17.5 bill 
C. SB 200 - How Will It Be Financed? 
DWR provided the Task Force with the following tab 
FINANCING SB 200 FACILITIES 
California Water Fund 
Miscel-
Tidelands S~vP Revenue laneous Obl Total 
Years Oil Revenue Bonds Receipts Bonds 
Revenue Transfers 
1981-85 87 85 0 25 0 197 
1986-90 125 873 1,026 25 83 2,132 
1991-95 100 1,511 1,271 25 84 2,991 
996-2000 0 58 0 0 0 5 
TOTAL 312 2,527 2,297 75 167 5 f 7 
As noted above, DWR has assumed that $2.297 bill 
revenue bonds would have to be issued to finance SB 200. Several 
problems may prevent DWR from marketing those bonds. 1 
Read has given the opinion that DWR's proposed schedule of bond 
financing for SB 200 "is reasonable under present market 
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it s the could success l issue 
te $300 ll ipal amount of revenue bonds per 
year during the period 1986 through 1995." Dillon, Read attaches 
or conditions to that op ion, however: 
1. Enactment of State legis ion rais 
the present interest rate maximum of 8~% "to 
levels required by then existing t 
conditions"; and 
2. Development of "appropriate documents 
authoriz and securing such revenue bonds". 
Dillon, Read assumes that water revenue bonds ll be 
stment income", and "may also be secured water revenues 
not der from water supply contracts the event of 
default bv one or more water contractors." It also assumes that 
all power facilities revenue bonds would be "completed" before 
SB 200 facilities revenue bonds would be issued. 
There are serious questions concerning the issuance of 
revenue bonds which have not been answered satisfactorilv. For 
example, the impact of the general deterioration of the bond 
market on S'i,JP bond sales has not been determined. 
been raised whether SvJP revenues can be committed to new revenue 
bond issues without impairing repayment of outstanding 
obl ion revenue bonds. The Task Force has noted these 
questions, and believes answers should be provided as 
soon as pass le. 
Tidelands fund revenues are a significant of St\TP 
f ing. DWR has assumed that it will receive $312 mill as 
set forth in the above table, from the Tidelands fund from 1981 
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the year 2 00, and s s revenue i 
factor whe r bonds are issued or "pay-as-you-go" 
ing is used. 
The 1982-1983 budget reduces the amount of tide 
revenues to go to SWP an expected $30 ll to $1 . 
llion. Cons the uncertain nature of state s, 
it is ssible to predict whether similar or more severe 
cutbacks can be cipated in the future. 
"c 
DWR describes present SWP financing as be 
cal revenue period", with revenues barely 
in a 
expenses 
until 1985. Loss of a substantial share of tidelands revenues 
would ir the construction schedule for SB 200 facil s. 
DWR has recently asserted the position that revenue 
bond financing may not be necessary at all, or to a much more 
limited extent. It suggested to the Task Force in January that 
"pay-as-you-go" financing would be possib At the Task Force's 
request, DWR analyzed the "pay-as-you-go" option. 
DWR's original "SB 200 Pay-As-You-Go Study" assumed 
no bonds at all would be sold to finance SB 200 ili 
11 t. lands fund monies would be availab , and SWP 
contractors would agree to modi their contracts and 
"surcharges" of up to 11% to provide additional revenues for 
funding requirements that otherwise would require bond sa s. 
DWP originally calculated the amounts of supplemental 
thout bonds needed for three different scenar s: (1) 
ilities p s Peripheral Canal; (2) existing facilities p 
Peripheral Canal, groundwater, and East Branch enlargement; and 
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3 0 { ) -Nowv c:. rsce 5 ( 1) ' 
unit water rates based on the same assumptions.] 
assume: 
DWR stated that the "pay-as-you-go" studies also 
(1) Water del r s are del 
dur a dry period similar to the 
period. 
(2) Where there is not enough water to meet 
lement requests, reductions are not 50% 
agricultural water first; instead all delive 
reduced proportionally (as sting contract 
18(b) requ s for permanent shortages). 
be 
(3) Construct of Themes-Newville is de 4 years 
from Bulletin 1~2-Bl's estimate. A 1989-1997 
construction period is used instead of a 1985-1993 
period. 
(4) The studies are cut off at year 2000, even 
the project repayment period does not end until the 
vear 2035. 
No other assumptions \vere originally identified. 
DWR concluded that approximately $214 million of 
"supplemental funding" in addition to $2.75 billion from 
"availab sources of funding" (California Water Fund, power 
revenue bonds, and other miscellaneous receipts) would be 
to build the $1.289 billion Peripheral Canal and to pay for $1.7 
bill of additional facilities. (The $1.7 billion inc s 
$300 million of SB 200 facilit s, $900 million of non-SB 00 
facilities, and $500 million of other non-SB 200 facil es 
such as stallation of additional pumps, according to DVJR.) 
Sl42 llion would be charged to SWP contractors as a surcharge, 
would require new contract agreements, with the remain $72 
llion accrued as rest. Interest would be accrued because 
surcharges would not be collected on an as-needed basis, but 
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would be spread even over a period of years. Annual $15.7 
ll surcharges would be imposed, beginning 1986 and 
continuing through 1994. 
If groundwater storage and the East Branch En 
are added, total capital requirements rise to $3.5 ll 
ing "supp tal funding" of $408 million to 
$3.1 llion from "available sources of funding''. s 
totalling $341 million would be collected over the years 1986 to 
1994, requiring annual payments of $37.8 million those years. 
If Themes-Newville is added, total capital 
would be $5.49 billion. $1.31 billion would needed, 1n 
addition to the $4.18 billion from "available sources of 
funding". Surcharges totalling $954 million would collected 
over the years 1986 to 1999 requiring additional annual s 
of $68 million. 
DWR contended that even though contractors would pay 
revenue surcharges, their total payments would be less than if 
DWR sold bonds and charged the contractors for the interest costs 
on those bonds to DWR. DWR claimed that "pay-as-you-go" wou be 
cheaper because of DWR's "project interest rate" calcu 
DWR stated that, if it does not issue bonds, but 
contractors' approval to use the "pay-as-you-go" 
revenue surcharge would be less than the impact on contractor 
pavments with projected "project interest rate'' increases. DWR 
charges contractors the "project interest rate" on re sab 
tal costs minus power revenues, even though DWR does not 
45 
actual pay interest for use of the California Water Fund 
{t Jands) money. 
Whenever DWR sells bonds, and the interest rate on the 
new bonds is different from previous rates, DWR adjusts the 
avera 1 " ect interest rate" for all bonded ss. For 
example, 1 1981, the "project interest rate" was 4.584%. In 
1981, Reid-Gardner power project Bond Anticipation Notes were 
sold at 8.5%. mm then recalculated its "project interest rate" 
to be 4.606%, and applied that higher 4.606% rate retroact 
to all outstanding indebtedness and required the contractors to 
pay retroactively for that increase as a balloon payment 1982. 
Power and water revenue bond issues projected by DWR to 
be sold at 8.5% would raise the "project interest rate" to 7. 34% 
by the end of 1994. If new bonds were sold at 12% (current 
market rates), the "project interest rate" would rise to 
approximately 9.2% by the end of 1994, and even more substantial 
balloon payments based on the increased interest rate would have 
to be paid by the contractors. 
DWR not provide an analysis of the comparat 
impacts on contractors of these balloon payments versus 
impacts of projected surcharges. 
No estimate was originally given by DWR for the 
"pay-as-you-go" study concerning the entire SB 200 package, ch 
includes other facilities such as Los Vaqueros. There was 
originally no surcharge estimate to compare directly to 
$2.297 billion in revenue bonds DWR has said would need to 
finance the $5.38 billion worth of SB 200 facilities. 
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Dv1R argued that it does not know what facili s 
would build a Thomes-Newville, or how it would choose to 
finance any other facilities after the year 2000. DWR 
stated that "pay-as-you-go" financing gives DWR the flexibil 
to proceed with the Peripheral Canal, and poss ly 
storage, the East Branch enlargement, and Thomes-Newville, and 
that what mav be bui after those facilities is ent 
speculative. 
Just before the last Task Force meeting, DWR gave the 
Task Force an estimate of surcharges that would be needed to 
build all the SB 200 facil s included in DWR's $5.378 
cost estimate. That final study shed new light on the 
three studies. 
ll 
1 
If all SB 200 facilities including the Peripheral 
Canal, groundwater storage, East Branch enlargement, 
Thomes-Newville, and Los Vaqueros were built by the year 2000, 
total capital requirements would be $6.8 billion (includes the 
additional $1.7 billion, the breakdown for which is noted above). 
$990 million would be collected as surcharges (on which interest 
would accrue in the amount of $240 million), in addition to the 
$5.59 billion from "available sources of funding". s 
would have to be collected beginning in 1984, and continuing 
through 1991. A 23% surcharge, $124 million, would be imposed 
annually. 
For the first time, DWR indicated that in all of 
"pay-as-you-go" studies has applied all presently planned SWP 
contract revenues ("revenue transfers") to SB 200 facilities 
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first, rather than to revenue transfers between SB 200 
non-SB 200 facilities as was done for DWR's original SB 200 
financing calculations. Those original calculations showed 
revenue bond financing of $2.297 billion with $2.527 billion 
revenue transfers allocated to SB 200 facilities. For s 
''pay-as-you-go" studies, DWR shifted all revenue transfers to 
SB 200 facil ies. By shifting SWP revenue transfers all to 
SB 200 facilit s, the result, according to DWR, will be all 
non-SB 200 facil ies will have to be financed with revenue 
bonds. In effect, DWR's "pay-as-you-go" proposal would be 
shifting the need to finance with revenue bonds 
ilities to non-SB 200 facilities. 
SB 200 
DWR argues that there are three reasons why the $990 
million of surcharges cannot directly be compared to the previous 
DWR estimate that $2.297 billion in revenue bond financing would 
be required. First, with surcharges, bond interest is not paid 
and there would be major savings to contractors after the year 
2000, because they would not be paying bond interest costs. 
Second, DWR is applying revenue transfers differently it d 
in its previous study which showed a need for $2.297 billion 
bonds. With the "pay-as-you-go" study, DWR is applying all 
revenue transfers to SB 200 facilities. The result of this is to 
shift the need for revenue bond financing to non-SB 200 
facilities. Third, as DWR originally attempted to explain, 
ect interest rate would not be increased as a resu of the 
issuance of revenue bonds at higher interest rates than the 
prevailing project interest rate. 
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Several additional assumptions have come to 1 as 
result of DWR's new full SB 200 surcharge studv. DWR has assumed 
it could use offset general obligation bonds totalling $167 
million for Thomes-Newville, an assumption which was not made for 
the previous study. Also, DWR revised its construction schedu 
for the full SB 200 study back to the construction schedule shown 
in Bul 132-81. (The construction schedule for 
Thomes-Newvil had been shifted in the third original study.) 
This shift construction schedules back to the Bullet 132-8 
schedule is one of the reasons that surcharges begin in 1984, 
ch is earlier than in the previous studies. 
DWR pointed out that it may seem unreasonable that 
full SB 200 surcharge of $990 million is only slightly 
than the $954 million surcharge without Los Vaqueros. DWR's 
response is that the new study charges a higher surcharge (23%) 
over a shorter period (only 8 years), and that the staging of 
capital requirements and surcharges is earlier. (The 1984-1991 
period the DWR uses in its full SB 200 surcharge study is not 
apparently consistent with other construction schedules used 
DWR [See Section 5B(2), above], although DWR has not explained 
that discrepancy.) 
DWR has still not provided an analysis of the 
comparative impacts on contractors of revenue bond financing 
interest costs and balloon payments, versus projected surcharges, 
or a comparison of the cost of revenue bond financing versus 
surcharge financing from the contractors' standpoint. V'Je 
recommend that these comparisons be made forthwith. 
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Several f 1 comments must made. Loss of 
revenues would affect pay-as-vou-qo calculations. If avai le 
sources are reduced, contractor payment surcharges wou 
be higher. If they are increased, contractor pavment 
would be lower. 
The "pay-as-you-go" studies end at year 2000. s 
appears to be too short a period. The studv should be 
for the ent SWP repayment period, to the year 2035. 
California Water Fund will have to be repa at some time, and 
that obl appears to be postponed with 
" s-you-go" until after the year 2000. Postponing 
of the Ca fornia Water Fund means more of the financ burden 
of the project will be shifted from the contractors to the 
general taxpayers of the State. 
DWR's shifts in construction periods significant 
affects total financing requirements. The shift in the 
s 
original study of the Thomes-Newville construction period spread 
tal cost irements more evenly over the 1983-2000 period. 
Shifts construct times would appear to have a direct 
on surcharge amounts. (These assumptions are also 
ana "pav-as-you-go" unit water rates. See discuss 
below.) 
D\'JR does not analyze the very important issue of how 
SWP contractors will obtain the additional revenue to pay the 
surcharges. Surcharges add 3% to contractor payments for the 
ral Canal, 9% if groundwater and the East Branch 
enlargement are added, and 11% if Themes-Newville is added, and 
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s 
ros s added. The possibili that s t 
13 may restrict the use of property taxes to pav for additional 
facilit s should be thoroughly considered, for example. 
discussion at Section 5D(2), below.] 
[See 
s-you-go" calculations do not account 
the st costs to the contractors of paving surcharges to DWR 
or the costs to 1 taxpayers of the State. In the 
"pay-as-you-go" plan only 
to al financing, to 
fts costs from SB 200 debt f 
general taxpayers, and to non-SB 200 
facili f Even if "pay-as-you-go" would be 
contractors, bond f ing postpones repayment, and that 
is self a bene to contractors. 
"Pay-as-you-go" studies do not reflect the true costs 
to contractors and the general taxpayers. There are major 
reasons. First, "pay-as-you-go" financing would shift financ 
costs to the contractors, a point which is graphically shown by 
the hundreds of millions of dollars of interest which the SWP 
would accrue on the surcharges. Second, "pay-as-you-go" would 
shift the need for revenue bond financing from SB 200 facil s 
to non-SB 200 faci s. And third, "pay-as-you-go" po s 
the time at which the SWP begins to repay the tidelands fund. 
All of these shifts, and the ramifications these fts 
would have on SWP contractors and the general taxpayers of the 
State should be quantified and investigated thoroughly. DWR's 
pay-as-vou-go" studies are clearly misleading as to the tota 
costs of financ SB 200 facilities without revenue bond 
financing. 
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1. Unit Water Rates 
In Bulletin 132-81 (page 13), DWR projected unit 
water rates in SWP service areas through the year 2000: 
ESTIHA_TED TOTAL UNIT vJATER RATES 
IN SWP SERVICE AREAS THROUGH YEAR 2000* 
The rates shown are 1981 dollars per acre-foot. The 
underl va s are in escalat_ed dollars 
per acre-foot, and take into account 
flation pro~ections. 
s~·JP ce Area 1981 1985 1990 1995 :?000 
River 27 30 37 54 111 63 183 64 207 
North Bay 209 362 216 402 205 486 198 521 
South Day 52 88 106 126 223 125 294 130 365 
Kern County \•later 38 54 68 83 157 85 211 87 250 
Agency (KC\\IA) 
San Joaquin 28 45 57 72 142 73 192 75 224 
(excluding KCWA) 
Southern California 160 219 273 277 476 283 592 288 753 
In calcu ing these unit water rates, DWR as 
construction of SB 200 facilities scheduled to be bui bv the 
vear 2000, financing with $2.297 billion revenue bonds at a bond 
interest rate of 8.5%, and capital, operation, maintenance, and 
replacement costs used in Bulletin 132-81. The escalated costs 
are based on an assumed annual inflation rate of 9% for 
construction (capital) and 7% for operation, maintenance, and 
replacement costs. The Task Force asked for an interest 
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ene co t akdown for these t rates, but DWR s 
suppl information. 
*Interest costs and power rates are very significant 
factors in estimating unit water rates. DWR assumed an interest 
rate of 8.5%. The Task Force believes 12% more correctly 
ref s current market conditions, and that use of a higher 
st rate would cause substantial increases in unit water 
rates. If DWR's estimated power rates are understated, unit 
water rates are understated as well. 
*It should be noted also that DWR's unit water rates 
ref only the rates the contractors will pay for water, and 
not eventual costs to consumers. The final consumers will be 
add ional costs added bv the intermediary contractors 
stricts. 
DWR did not include an additional $1.5 billion which it 
has calculated would be additional local deliverv system costs. 
Even though local costs are not project costs per se, they are 
costs which must be paid over the life of the project, and ld 
be noted. 
change 
The unit water rates are directly affected by any 
the amount of water to be delivered. The 1981 
e unit water rates for Southern California are 
than 1980 estimates because of what DWR described as a 
"significant decrease in projected water deliveries in 1981 
Southern California service area when compared to the 
projection used in estimating the 1980 unit rates." 
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At the st of the Force, DvlR a 
of unit water rates in SWP service areas on a "pay-as-you-go" 
basis, assuming five different combinations of facilities: 
1. Base case, existing SWP facilities only; 
2. Existing facilities plus Peripheral Canal; 
3. Plus groundwater program and East Branch en 
ment; 
4. Plus Thomes-Newville; 
5. All SB 200 facilities. 
It was assumed for studies 2, 3, and 4, that no water revenue 
or general obligation "offset" bonds would be sold to 
finance SB 200 facilities. [But see discussion above re to 
the that this assumption would only shift the need for 
revenue bond financing from SB 200 facilities to non-SB 200 
facilities.] The new DWR full SB 200 surcharges study is not 
reflected in the fifth unit rate study. Unit water rates are 
shown in both 1981 dollars and escalated dollars. 
Us the figures for the Southern California and San 
Joa service areas for the year 2000 as an example, 
additional yield has the effect of preventing a signi rise 
unit water rates if the demand for water increases as DWR s 
projected: 
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s 
Sou the 
Base Case 
sting 
facilities) 
l 
3 
East Branch 
4 
Thomes-
Newvil 
Study 5 
(SB 200) 
, 
) 
Hater 
Deliveries 
(AF) 
994,000 
1,420,000 
1,534,000 
1,569,000 
1,587,000 
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Area - Year 2000 
Unit Rate 
( $ I AF ) (1 9 8 1 
dollars) 
303 
253 
253 
256 
288 
Unit Rate 
($I AF) 
(esca 
dol 
675 
576 
574 
608 
753 
Joaquin ce Area - Year 2000 
Un Rate 
·water Unit Rate ($I AF) 
Deliveries ($/AF) (1981 (esca 
(AF) dollars) dol 
539,000 90 207 
+: . 
Li1Cl 
778,000 77 177 
plus 1,037,000 68 160 
ter, 
East Branch 
en ) 
4 1,?10,000 65 173 
Thomes-
lle) 
5 1,337,000 84 243 
(SB 200) 
There appear to be problems with DWR's "pay-as-you-go" 
water rate assui'l.ptions. Dii'7R' s studies show that the 
rate of water will increase substantially from 1985 to 2000 
new facilities are built, but will decrease slight if 
tional facilities are built. DWR explains: 
"As additional conservation facil s are 
to the sting facilities and project 
yield is reased, the unit cost of 
transportat facilities will decline. 
le s decrease in transportation 
facility unit cost is offset by an increase 
in conservation facility unit costs, the unit 
cost of water does not exceed that which 
would prevail with existing facilities until 
all of the SB 200 facilities are 
constructed." 
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·c 11- no 
s statement ies a "sunk" tran 
facility costs stop decreasing, unit water rates will increase 
more rapidly with additional facilities. 
m-JR studies should be expanded to show coJTtparative unit 
water rates for the full repayment period, to the year 2035. 
Also, as noted above regarding projected contractor surcharges to 
fund "pay-as-you-go" financing, "pav-as-you-qo" does not ref 
the fact "nav-as-you-qo" would postpone repayJTtent of the 
California Water Fund monies until after the year 2000, and 
ef postnonement would have on unit rates. 
The years up until year 2000 may present an cal 
f at curve for unit rate increases. DWR's study impl s that 
rates will stay level or even decrease slightly so long as 
new conservation facilities are built. The "base case" of 
existing facilities shows that rates increase if new yield is not 
developed. 
DWR states that development of new yield is forecast 
on up to the year 2000 and that DWR believes is specu 
t.o quess r or how additional yield will be developed after 
2000 and Thof'l.es-Newville. \flhen DWR reaches the point where nev1 
ld is not be developed, un rates apparently will 
to increase until construction costs are repaid, then f 
, increasing only as power and other operation and 
costs increase. Extending the "pay-as-you-go" 
studies to year 2035 is necessary to develop these issues 
r. 
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out 
DWR's unit water rates, regard ss of the 
as s which are used, meld already developed water and 
substant lly more expensive new water into a single rate . The 
unit water rates do not show the cost of new water separately 
from a 
bJ 
extrer.te 
developed water, but soften those new costs 
new and present costs together. Even so, it is 
fficu to understand how unit water rates would 
decrease where new water is more expensive to develop per acre 
foot than sting supplies. 
2. Capacitv of SWP Contractors to Pay Increased Rates 
An increase in water rates has a direct bearing on 
water usage. And, at the same time, decreased use results 
increased unit water prices. 
It is generally recognized that urban water use 
ll probably be less affected by a rate increase than 
agricultural water use. According to University of California 
ltural economists, water prices do influence the amount 
by irrigators. The farmer must balance water costs \vi th 
l income. Farmers mav react to higher water prices 
crop patterns or irrigation methods, or by going out of 
ion. 
Very litt is actually known about how 
would react to rate changes. A great deal depends on the type of 
crop being grown, the crop's relative water requirements and 
development costs, and the class of soil. 
Un si of California studies indicate that 
many crops cannot economically be grown where water rates exceed 
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100 per acre-foot. In some cases, ases to between $50 
$100 per acre-foot have caused changes in crops and irr t 
methods. There is little dependable research on the "elas i 
of demand 11 for irrigation, i.e., the percentage change water 
use assoc th a s lar percentage change the l 
cost of water. 
The rates ect~d by DWR will some cases 
exceed cultural users can afford to pav. San 
Va farmers to the fact that SB 200 water is much more 
expensive than existing SWP yield. The present SWP 2.3 ll 
acre-feet ld has cost $2.67 billion at low interest rates. 
200 v ld will cost $5.4 llion for 1.4 mill acre-feet, at 
probably much higher interest rates. The cost of the new more 
expensive water is blended with the cost of already developed 
ld, but even the blended average cost of water could be too 
high for many San Joaquin Valley farmers, who believe they will 
be "blended out of business" by SB 200. 
There apparently is only rudimentary 
on the repayment capacity of SWP contractors. No 
actual repavment capacity studies appear to have been done DWR 
or the contractors. 
An issue of overriding importance in ana the 
capacity of the contract.ors to pay for SB 200 is hm;r contractors 
ll raise necessary funds. Basic revenue sources for water 
stricts are property taxes, user charges, and various 
debt instruments. 
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t 
lability of property taxes to contractors. Recent lit 
(Goodman v. Rivers ) raises the issue of whether contractors 
are or are not prohibited by Proposition 13 from levying property 
taxes to pav new SWP facilities. 
Property taxes augment user charges. In the case 
of contractors who actually receive no water, property taxes are 
used exc Increases in user charges will eventual 
effect of reducing demand. Goodman raises the verv s 
ss ili that contractors may not be able to levy the 
taxes needed in addition to user charges to pay 
rates to build SB 200 facilities. 
3. AssumPtions Resarding Power Rates 
sed water 
Unit water costs depend on assumptions as to 
energv rates, interest rates, and construction costs. DWR power 
rate assumptions have been widelv disputed. After April 1, 1983, 
power costs for pumping water will comprise most of the SWP's 
ly operating costs and more than 40% of the charges 
SWP contractors in certain vears. Power purchase and sale 
contracts entered into in 1966, will terminate March 31, 1983, 
rates will be s cantly increased. 
needs 
mm has made a long-range estimat.e of future power 
costs. The following is a summary of those 
projections: 
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1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Total Energv Reauirement 5.013 7.280 9.001 9.587 10.259 
llions of KNH) 
Total SHP Composite Rate .45 1. 81 3.55 3.66 3.82 
(cents /KWH, in 1981 
dollars) 
Total SvJP ...... SlL8 Rate .45 2.77 4.06 5.31 8.02 
(cents /Kv7H, in esca 
dol ) 
Utili 
Rates (cents/ 
KHH, ,Ju 1981 Calif. 
COillL'Tli s s ion He port 
dollars) 
Pacific Gas & Electric 5.67 8.31 12.45 17.83 32.82 
Southern Calif. Edison 6.83 10.29 16.04 25.07 36.54 
San Diego Gas & Electric 8.30 13.18 22.94 37.25 47.56 
The projected energy cost:s for SWP pumping are 
The projected SvJP pumping load wi 11 10.259 
llion KWH year 2000. The 10.259 bill KNH est 
assumes DWR calls a "median condition of water H f 3" 7 
ll acre-feet per vear. m'JR staff indicates that the 3. 7 MAF 
figure inc s ly 3.2 ~~F of entitlement water, 
400,000 AF surplus water, 140,000 AF related to the groundwater 
storage program, and 24,000 AF related to SWP operation 
irement.s. If ss than 3.7 MAF is pumped in the year 2000 
the energy requirements 11 be ss. 
DWR will operate as a separate maier energy 
utili after 1983. Bul 132-81 contains a comprehens 
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desc ion of Slr.JP s resources. DWR states 
Year 2000 energy requirements will be met as follows: 56.9% 
hydro; 10.9% geothermali 9.7% coal; 9% "Edison exchange''; 7.5% 
"biomass"~ .3% wind; and, 10.7% from additional sources of the 
sane s. 
s 
If 10 billion Kli'lH are required in the year 2000, 
at 8.02 cents K\iJH, annual power charges in escalated dol 
11 be $802 rr.ill In 1981 dollars, annual year 2000 
s 
s 
11 be $382 million (3.82 cents per KWH for 10.259 llion KWH) • 
In rate 
energy costs 
ected 
derived calculations, Dvm estimated year 2000 
1981 dollars) would be $207 
tlement water deliveries. 
llion for 
Several factors affect the estimates of total 
total 
power charges. One is that power costs will be higher if water 
revenue bond interest rates are higher than the 8~% rate assumed 
in Bulletin 132-81. Another factor is the potential that the SWP 
mav have to purchase more power from Southern California son 
nd others than now anticipated (if, e.g., some of the 
power sources it plans to use do not meet their cost energy 
ion assumptions). 
DPR's rate projections are substantial 
than the projected average rates of the State's major e c 
util 
actual 
s. That disparity may mean that DWR energy rates 
be higher than it is now projecting. It would be 
valuable to compare projected DWR power rates with other 
util s' wholesale off-peak power charges to evaluate that 
issue. 
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SB 200 - How Huch New t.Vater \tJill It ? 
1. Current SWP Yield and Maximum Deliveries 
The amount of water that the SWP can dependab 
deliver in all but critically dry vears is called "firm yield". 
eld is made available from two sources: 
1. Exports from the Delta of unregulated 
after Delta water quality criteria are met~ 
2. Release of water stored during wet periods 
dry per s. 
DNR bases its est tes on the dry year 1928-1934 
period. 
In ly dry years, SWP water supp 
contracts allow reduced deliveries (deficiencies). Be anv 
deficiencies are imposed on municipal users such as the 
se 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, agricultural 
deliveries can be reduced by up to 50% in any one year and up to 
a total of 100% in any seven consecutive years. Farmers are 
therefore more immediately threatened by dry years. 
SWP contractors have contracted for a 
annual del of 4.23 llion acre-feet per annum of le 
supply from 1990 on. This water is "entitlement water". 
year 2000, demand for SWP contract entitlement water is now 
projected by DWR to be approximately 3.2 million acre-feet per 
annum. Present dependable water supplv from existing SWP 
facil ies is 2.3 million acre-feet per year. 
The difference between contract amounts and SWP 
ld will become over time if no new facilities are 
added. DWR estimates that SWP firm annual yield will decrease to 
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between 1.6 and .8 acre- per year by the year 2000. 
This will result from increased uses in areas of origin, 
increased use bv the federal CVP, whose rights are prior in 
to the State's, and from what DWR describes as "reduced 
and a 
ant 
MAF. 
ttent excess suppl s" of water the De Us 
2000 estimate of 3.2 million acre-feet (~~F) per year 
annual v ld of between 1.6 and 1.8 MAF annually, DWR 
s a shortfall in a dry year 2000 of between 1.4 and 1 6 
It shou be recognized that in most vears, the 
SvlP has delivered more than the firm vield of 2. 3 l\1AF. DWR 
est s that five of the previous nine years, total del 
ility of the SWP exceeded 3 million acre-feet and two of 
those vears exceeded 2.7 million acre-feet. Estimated 1981 
deliveries were 2.8 million acre-feet. 
The SWP also delivers "surplus water", which is water 
that the SWP has available to deliver in excess of amount of 
entitlement water delivered. San Joaquin Valley farmers have 
been sing s water for approximately $5 per acre-
ch pays the SWP for the power and other variable costs 
cur red 1 the water. Surplus water is not water 
that is exchanged between the Metropolitan Water and San 
Joaquin ValJey farmers. The SWP sells water as surplus that is 
not needed to meet contract entitlements, and no reimbursement is 
made to contractors who do not take delivery of the 
ent lement amount. 
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full 
2 . 
There is a direct relationship between SWP vield 
Delta water quality criteria. Most of the water available 
for export by the SWP and CVP is Sacramento River water. 
Sacramento River water is pulled across the Delta to the 
More water is exported than can be transferred from 
Sacramento River the Del~a cross-channel and Georgiana S 
throuqh the Central Delta, and the excess water must flow 
Sacramento r into the Western Delta and then 
upstream (reverse flow) where it rejoins the cross-De to 
export pumps. During low outflow periods, as Sacramento 
River water moves into the Western Delta, it becomes more sal 
because of the intrusion of salt water toward the Western Delta 
from San Francisco Bay. There is a direct relationship between 
the salinity of water in the Western Delta and the amount of 
fresh water flowing out of the Delta. 
The SWRCB requires the CVP and SWP to operate so 
is suff Delta fresh water outflow to meet SWRCB 
Decision 1485 water quality standards. The CVP chal 
SWRCB authority to place conditions on federal project 
s the 
operations, although it has agreed to help meet the 
voluntarily except in dry and critically drv vears. The North 
Delta Water Agency and the East Contra Costa Irrigation Di ct 
has entered into contracts with the Department of Water Resources 
which require the SWP to operate to water quality standards 
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comparable to D- 4 5 The CVP not j 
contracts. 
D-1485 and these contracts establish certain 
standards for certain points in the Delta and requires that water 
qual at se po s man In dry years, these 
standards are primarily met by outflow of Sacramento fre 
water, whether natural Sacramento River f or from the 
re se of stored project water. 
A certain additional amount of sh water outflow 
must be naintained either by natural river flow or by re se of 
project water to repel sa water from Western De 
sure that fresh water will not be mixed wi water a 
it is drawn around the western edge of the Delta to the 
This additional outflow is called "carriage water". When 
flow in the Sacramento River is low, more of the necessary 
carriage water comes from releases of SWP and CVP stored water. 
The Peripheral Canal and alternative Delta 
transfer facil s would provide vield for SWP rna 
because water could carried around or through the De 
that water would no longer be needed. th the 
l Canal or a through-De ility, Sacramento 
water would not have to be pulled back around the Western Delta 
to the export pumps. 
3. Projected Yield of the Peripheral Canal and SB 200 
to the 
Task Force has heard con icting te 
itv of additional water which will be made 
export through construction and operation of the 
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l 
" l '-ana~. In a July 1981 position published 
"The Peripheral Canal and Other SB200 Facilities," DWR est 
a range of 475,000 to 630,000 acre-feet of water would be made 
available for export by the Peripheral Canal. 
DWR now estimates that 700,000 acre-feet of 
additional water will be made available for export through 
construction and operation of the Peripheral Canal, primari 
eliminating the need for "carriage water". According to DWR, 
1 of the Canal would provide 300,000 acre-feet of that 
ional yie [See discussion at Section 8B, below.] 
Peripheral Canal vield may range from 500,000 acre- to IVlAF 
noting that the CVP has estimated Canal vield to be as low as 
200,000 acre-feet. 
The vield figure that is used depends on what 
assumptions are made. m'm has assumed, for example, that the 
SWRCB will reduce Hay and June export pumping limitations when 
the Peripheral Canal is built. (The SWRCB has not indicated 
it would do so.) 
DWR's 700,000 acre-feet yield estimate assumes 
that CVP 11 help meet SWRCB water auality standards 
and critically dry years. DWR acknmvriedges that if CVP does 
not help meet the standards, the 700,000 acre-feet yield will he 
decreased. DWR bel s that decrease would not be substant 1. 
The Bureau of Reclamation has implied that the SWP would have to 
use more than the 700,000 acre-feet yield of the Peripheral Canal 
to make up ~or the CVP's not helping to meet standards. 
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DWR hns n]so nst mntnd additional v n rom 
other SB 200 projects: 
Acre-feet per Year 
Groundwater 400,000 
Cottonwood 200,000 
Thomes-Newville 220,000 
Los Vaqueros 265,000 
The total of projected yields, including the 
Peripheral Canal, is 1.785 million acre-feet per year. DWR does 
not include in this est the SB 200 figure of a 700,000 
acre-foot per year reduction in SWP water demand by the 2 00 
resulting from water conservation and water reclamation. DWR 
explains that: 
"Water conservat1on and locally-sponsored 
reclamation projects only defer (rather than 
reduce) the SWP demands because they do not 
contribute toward meeting the maximum annual 
water entitlements in the SWP contracts. 
However, if a waste water reclamation 
development is made part of the SWP, s 
yield would contribute to meeting the 
. 4.23 million acre-foot maximum annual 
s of the SWP and thus would 
sent a permanent reduction SWP 
exports from the Delta." 
This st~tement is not logical. If water 
conservation programs can reduce demand significantly, actual 
demand may never reach maximum annual water entitlement amounts. 
If conservation would defer demand for a long time or 
permanently, only users of cheaper surplus water would benef 
from unnecessary expansion of the SWP. [See discussion at 
Section 11, below.] 
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Dvm has prepared Bulletin 76-81 a detailed 
table listing projected reclamation projects which it describes 
as "more promising" but which are all still described as e 
"under study" or "future study". The total of these poss le 
projects, presumably would be included in SWP 1 i 
37,500 acre-feet per vear. 
DWR estimates that there will be a 12-year gap 
between dependab SWP supply and projected demand, from 1983 
1995. gap may extend past 1995 if construction les 
are delayed. Completion bv 1995 is based on DWR's "most 
optimistic schedule". There may not actuallv he shortages ng 
12-year period, if future water years are normal water years 
rather than drought years. The projected shortages and il 
of the SWP to meet demands would occur if there were an extended 
drought period similar to the 1928-1934 drought. 
F. SB 200 - What Will Actuallv Be Built If Proposition 9 
Passes? 
SB 200 provides for the Peripheral Canal and storage 
reservo s, but of these SB 200 on mandates 
construct of the Peripheral Canal (and, by lication, sun 
Marsh and South Delta water quality faci ies which must be 
bui before Canal construction is completed) . The other rna or 
lities in SB 200, Los Vaqueros, groundwater storage, Glenn, 
Colusa, and the Mid-Valley Canal, are subject to feasibility 
studies. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern Cali 
(JilV'JD) stated to the Ta Force that only the Peripheral Canal is 
"on the table", and that approval of SB 200 is not a decision to 
build any of the SB 200 facilities except the Peripheral Canal. 
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There are dif rent f u 
be if Proposition 9 passes. The fact Los Vaqueros 
Glenn Reservoirs are listed in SB 200 certa ly l s 
approval of SB 200 will mean that se reservo s will be 
mJR now tetke s s ion re s never be 
, and does not even lude est cost 
its total cost est s for SB 200. 
It is not c facil s, if any, 11 be 
if s 9 passe . st that 
the bel f a certa SB 200 facil would be bu 
ld at least be appri m·m of DWR' s sent ion 
ld or not a 
G. 1 Canal s. 
Fe as 1 s required by SB 200 will 
cost information for some facil s, but not 1 
Canal. The must orepare a feas ili 
ros, groundwater facilities, sa s 
the 1 Canal. To a extent, 
feas ili on Canal would 
the for s Task Force 1 s Section 11257 re 
that f ial fea ibil s conta 
the Task Force has tr very hard to obta 
a. An tial of pro ect 
costs to ect purposes. 
b. The proposed method of f 
c. An est of the of 
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H. 
d. An fication of water and 
power contractors are proposed to repay 
the allocated reimbursable water development 
costs including interest if any, on upstream 
storage, conveyance, operations, maintenance 
and replacement .. 
e. An estimate of the impact upon 
1 water prices in the various 
areas of the project. 
SB 200 and Fi s Questions - What is the " 
Level 11 
SB 200 provides that construction of the Peripheral 
Canal shall commence only if DWR and DFG enter into a nent 
sh and wildli agreement. That agreement must for 
11 the restoration and maintenance of adult populations of fi 
wildlife at storical levels in the Delta and the Suisun Mar 
and the San Francisco Bay System westerly of the Delta 11 and for 
the "realization of the potential of the project for increas 
these resources above . [historical] levels. II (SB 200 
also requires the federal government to enter into a permanent 
fish agreement with the State to meet "historical levels" be 
Peripheral Canal is used to transport water for the CVP. 
II storical levels" are to be maintained by 1 
s divers s to storage, as necessary. s cal 
level" is defined to mean "the average annual abundance 
through 1967 of the adult populations of fish and wildlife 
estimated to have lived in or been dependent upon any area, as 
determined bv the Department of Fish and Game." DFG would 
preferred a pre-CVP base period, but the CVP began s in 
1944, and the 1922-44 period contained 7 critically dry years. 
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? 
It was decided that a base period would be needed to 
normalize the flow data. The resulting 1972-67 period was a 
compronise. DFG agreed to accept the detriments caused by CVP 
diversions and other diversions from 1944 to 1967. The projects 
to in the base period the bene of 
summer flows that resulted from release of stored >vater. Ne 
DFG nor projects are sure what all the implications of us 
chosen base period will be. 
The "historical level" term describes a concept rather 
than a DFG explains that the concept was deve 
the 1970's during negotiations between DFG, DWR, the Bureau 
of Reclamation, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. SWP 
CVP ect operations, other upstream diversions, and factors 
not related to water development have adversely affected Delta 
fisheries. It is DFG's position that the SWP and CVP will have 
to restore flow levels that existed during the 1922-1967 period 
to the extent that flows are essential to maintain fish and 
ldli 
case 
levels. DFG is now in the process of deciding, on a 
basis, what flow levels are required. 
" storical levels" is not a clearly-defined 
SB 200 gives DFG absolute discretion in determining what 
"historical level" means. The historical level concept is 
described in the draft Memorandum of Agreement between DFG and 
Dl'1R (November 1980) , which sets forth principles for dete 
histor 1 levels and standards. Historical levels will not be 
determined for every species; selected individual species or 
of species will be used. So long as overall fish and 
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ldlife resource va s are mainta , some s 
storical levels will be acceptable. 
DFG has indicated that a new draft DFG-DWR agreement is 
scheClu to be released by mid-April, together with a draft EIR 
on the dra agreement. That new draft will not conta precise 
specifications for the Hood fish screen, but will require only 
the screen be effective enough to achieve historical ls. 
The draft 11 also reflect DFG's position that 
historical levels are to be achieved only after the Peripheral 
Canal is completed. s question was specifical 
during the IRgislature•s consideration of SB 200, but SB 200 does 
not conta any such express limitation. The Task Force has not 
been able to obtain an ansv..rer to the extremely important quest 
of whether the SV'JP must meet historical levels even if the 
Peripheral Canal is never built. 
The CVP and SWP responsibility, according to DFG, is 
limited to effects in the Delta, Suisun Harsh, and San Francisco 
cau the projects and other upstream diversions. The 
of SB 200, however, does not limit the respons il to 
detriments of the project, and fears have been expressed that 
such an open-ended commitm8nt could severely restrict water 
delivery capability. When DFG identifies an adverse effect on 
flows caused by CVP or SWP operations, DFG will determine to what 
that adverse ef would have occurred between 1922 
1967, using historical flow and salinity records. A standard 
will then be set to provide conditions comparab to 1922-67 
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tions 1 and project will have t.o 
The SWP and CVP would have to modifv ope rat 
to meet the standards. The projects are running operations 
s s to would have to pav for anv operat 
o. s attributable to SWP operation would 
to SWP contractors. Depletions bv other upstream 
rs s wou be charged to the State's General Fund. 
to 
s 
s 
In presentations to the Task Force, DFG added the 
1 level con relates only to effects the Delta, 
Suisun Marsh, and San Francisco Bay. It is DFG's 
of SR 200 that the SHP is not obligated to restore, for 
San Joaqu sa run to historical levels, since that 
sherv has been adversely affected by many factors 
S\'llP ope DFG has not indicated the manner which 
would be able to separate out the effects on fisheries of 
indus al pollution or other water quality problems not re 
to sal sion. 
6. l'-CA 90 (Propos 8) 
The f 
slature 
1 version of SB 200 was last amended 
10, 1980. Senator l .. vala, who SB 
200, and the coalition which supported the bill at that 
not to make any additional amendments to the bi As a 
result, a number of ef s were made to move companion 
islation would be "linked" to passage of SB 200. The 
on successful companion bill was Assembly Constitutional 
Amendment 90 authored by Assemblyman Kapiloff. 
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ACA 90 was on as Propos 8 the Novenber 
1980 statewide elect Although Propos ion 8 was approved, 
ACA 90 speci cally provides that it will have no force or effect 
un ss SB 200 is enacted and takes effect. If the SB 200 
referendum is defeated in June, the provisions of ACA 90 11 
also be defeated. On the other hand, the provisions of ACA 90 
ll be effect whether or not anv facilities are bui 
sit 9 passes. 
ACA 90 does four main things: 
1. Certa provisions of SB 200 cannot 
amended or repealed un ss approved bv people 
of the State, and can be changed by a two-thirds 
vote of islature only if the change does 
not reduce its protection of the Delta or fish 
wildli These are provisions for the protection 
of fish and wildlife and Delta water rights and 
SB 200 requirenents that the SWP be operated to 
comply with water quality standards and plans. 
2. Water cannot be appropriated for export 
from the California Wild and Scenic River Svstem 
without a vote of the people or a two-thirds vote 
of the Legislature. 
3. The Delta Protection Act cannot be 
amended or repealed wi a vote of the peop 
be two-thirds vote of the 
change does not reduce the 
or fish and wi fe. 
4. State court 1 ion that in anv way 
attacks SB 200 or any of s provisions 11 be 
expedited several respects. 
No estimates have been made of costs attributable to ACA 90. 
f 
ACA 90 was intended to give constitutional status and 
protection to some of the environmental protection provisions of 
SB 200 and to the North Coast rivers. However, ne r ACA 90 
nor SB 200 water qual provisions have any effect on the actual 
water quali standards set by the State Water Resources Control 
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Board. The Board s to control se , and 
in reconsider its current Decision 1485 standards in 1986 or 
before. ACA 90 and SB 200 may prevent the Legislature from 
ing Delta water quality standards, but the State Water 
Resources Control Board continues to have that power. 
The environmental protections contained in ACA 90 are 
discussed at Sect 9, below. The State court 1 
ACA 90 unticipates is scussed at Section BA, below, as a source 
of foreseeable de 
.., 
I • Evaluating an 
-··c5l::-t ob p 1 ~m" 
lding the Peripheral Canal. 
Peripheral 
A. Description of the Plan 
- The 
Dr. G. T. Orlob prepared a proposal in 1981, for the 
Central Delta Water Agency entitled "Delta Water Transfer 
A Peripheral Canal". The Orlob proposal is similar to several of 
alternatives studied by DWR in its 1975 Delta Alternatives 
Study. Dr. Orloh presented s "Alternative Water Transfer P an" 
to the Task Force. Both Dr. Orlob and DWR have provided the Task 
Force extens analysis of the Alternative Plan and 
isons of the Alternative Plan and the l Canal 
the costs and impacts. 
The Alternative Plan is not as far along detai 
ineerinq work leading up to project working drawings as 
Peripheral Canal. But, from the information provided to the Task 
Force, the concept appears to be sound and feasible. 
The Plan facilities would make use of 
existing Delta channels. Instead of construction of a new 
man-made canal around the Delta, the Alternative would se 
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ci of l De ls as necessary to 
more water to move across inter Delta to S\vP and CVP 
expo:r:-t pumps. 
The Alternative Plan would increase the amount of water 
that can be d from the Sacramento River at 
Delta Cross-Channel at Walnut Grove to channels in the 
Delta. Between 5,000 and 6,000 cubic feet per second can now be 
carr Cross-Channel. The Alternative Plan calls a 
new p to be near Walnut Grove (the exact 
locat is not speci which would have a divers 
of about 16,000 cub feet per second. Sacramento water 
be lifted 1 or 2 feet. With this increased s 
water would not have to be pulled back around Sherman Is to 
the export pumps. A fish screen could, if required, be instal 
at the intake structure and has been included in the cost 
estimates. 
Dr. Or lob states that the vJalnut Grove pump wou need 
to be approx 25% of the time. The pumps would be 
rated less wet years and more in dry years. 
on when Delta flow is so low that 
se null Sacramento River water back 
Is ope rat would take into account the needs 
ion of sher s. 
Some inter Delta channels would have to be 
and the levees set back to handle the additional water 
from the Sacramento River, e.g., the upper end of 
north forks of the Mokelumne River near the Sacramento 
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rs se s of Old River and ddle near 
export pumps. Dr. Orlob stated that the channel en and 
levee setbacks can be engineered to eliminate channel scouring 
otherwise would result from increased water velocities. 
In ion to enlarging the channels of Old r 
le River, "t pumps" would be installed to improve the 
c ion of water South Delta channels. Circu 
those channels is poor because of low San Joaquin r f 
the ef of pumpinq. 
Installation of improved fish screens mav he 
at existing export pumps. DWR asserts that the Al 
Plan would also have to include barriers Sutter and Steamboat 
S s to prevent the Sacramento River from reversing flow 
rection below Walnut Grove. Dr. Orlob responds that proper 
operation of the Alternative Plan would not create those reverse 
flows and that no barriers would be needed. SWRCB water quality 
s and the North Delta Water Agency contract would anv 
event it ion in a way which would create such reverse 
flm,Js. 
B. isons 
DWR has estimated that the "yie " of 
Pe ral Cn.nal ll be approximately 700,000 acre-feet per 
vear. This yield is based on two factors: (1) the State and 
l projects will not have to provide "carriage water" 
order to rna qual of the Sacramento water that 
s pulled back around Sherman Island to the export pumps; 
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ect wou d not be as severe l 
June for fishery protection. 
Dr. Orlob claims the Alternative Plan will provide 
at least the same yield as Peripheral Canal, with 
inter De water quality. DWR and Dr. Orlob 
plans would prevent the export pumps from drawing water 
stern De and that both plans would save the loss of 
" water" and increase the water availab for 
It is speculative to try to compare yields f 
Canal and ive, since yield estimates 
complete on the assumptions made. DWR has made the c 
rnative Plan 11 provide only 550,000 acre- of ld 
per year instead of 700,000 acre-feet. It is important to 
understand the basis for DWR's claim, since it has been wide 
licized, whether is speculative or not. Its reasoning is 
based on water quality standards: D-1485 water quality s 
l t export pumping May and June of all years to 3,000 CFS 
each S\·1P and CVP , July to 4,700 CFS SWP. 
purpose of is 1 tation is to ze the of 
bass fron Delta. DWR estimates 
curtailnent sents a loss of 150,000 acre-feet of 
both projects, and argues that the SWP would be credi 
that s if the Peripheral Canal were built and a less 
drastic curtailment were imposed for the Peripheral Canal 
diversion at Hood. 
These assumptions are speculative. The SWRCB ha 
not that it would change its standards for the 
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l Canal. In , no standards been set for either 
the Canal or Alternative or even discussed by the SWRCB. 
There is no non-speculative basis for comparing Peripheral Canal 
and Alternative Plan yields at this time. On the basis of 
ce sented to Task Force, is clear on that both 
lans wou save same amount of carriage water absent act 
the SHRCB. 
C. Effect of Levee Failure 
The cont integrity of the Delta levee systeM 
is an issue at heart of the Peripheral Canal vs. Alte 
Plan DWR argues that there is a constant of 
fai the Delta that will jeopardize SWP exports unless the 
continuing to take water through the interior De channels will 
assure the cont interest of DWR and SWP contractors the 
protection and maintenance of Delta levees the future. 
Keeping export water the Delta "common pool" provides a 
s 1 guarantee that Delta water quality will be rna 
and De levees 11 be protected to some extent, as sed to 
a contractual, statutory, or constitutional guarantee. 
The Delta. sts argue that the Alternat 
Plan would :rml le bene£ for less capital stment 
than iso Canal. They argue that instead of bui 84 
les of new to create the Peripheral Canal, sting 
levees should be improved, which would solve water transfer 
le~s and part of the problems at the same 
also that the inpact of levee ilures on export is small 
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the p wou be less with the than 
w th t.he Canal. 
Some De islands in the Central and Western 
Delta are made of deep peat soils of various depths. Some 
foundat s rest on peat soils. The e s 
slands are below sea level and are decl llv 
soi s are present. Concern has been expressed 
could many s at the same t 
has never been identi as a cause of levee 
ilure. has stated De system 11 has a 
of s "vJhen a De fails 
under balanced flow s, entire island f 
salt water the De from Suisun Bay. Until the 
water can be flu from Delta, diversions must be d 
and in the worst case s mav take several months." 
The Burns-Porter Act (Water Code §12934(d) {3) 
lists as "De facil ies" facilities for "transfer 
o water across the De " and for "flood and sal control 
luded flood control and seepage control features 2 o 
s 3 a "Delta Water Facil ies" described f st 
lletin 76 960 Those a ives for master 
levees and flood and seepage control. DWR at 
that time to pursue its "Single Purpose Delta Water Pro4ect" 
which no flood control benef s. 
DV7R s posi has continued to be that De 
lood ~ontrol should be as a separate prob the 
l Canal and a s, and that the SWP should not 
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have to take on re Delta levees as 
opposed to the SWP, has that respons litv or not). 
Re ibility for De levees and the maintenance is 
lly an unresolved issue, although DWR must continue to meet 
Delta water quality standards. DWR also has obl itself 
North Delta Water Agency contract to make all reasonable 
e forts to restore water quality as soon as pass if a 
occurs. 
There are several aspects of the "levee problem". 
First is of a break on current SWP rations 
and relative effectiveness of the Peripheral Canal or 
Alte Plan to respond to protect Delta water qual 
Second is the question whether export will be stopped if 
Peripheral Canal is built. Other issues inc to what extent 
the State is responsible for levee protection and maintenance. 
The impact of a levee break on SWP operation 
depends on factors such as the location and time of the break and 
Delta outflow at t Dr. Orlob analyzed the effects of 
levee fai s on Delta water quality for two s, the LTune 
1972 Brannan-Andrus break and the September 1980 Lower Jones 
'fract break. The Brannan-Andrus break occurred th low outflow 
s dur the summer. The Lower ,Jones Tract break 
occurred during relatively low f conditions during September. 
The Brannan-Andrus break was the most serious 
levee lure because occurred during a time outflow of 
fresh water was low. 50,000 acre-feet of water 
flooded the is thin 48 hours. Saline water moved ly 
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upstream and intruded well the Western Delta. In response 
to the break, export pumps were shut off and an additional 4,000 
CFS was released from storage. The quality of export water was 
worse for about a 3-week period. Saline water was " " in 
Southwestern Delta near the export pumps; it could not be 
flushed out of Delta, but instead had to be lly 
and bv interior Delta users. of sa r 
water increased ave exported "salt load" 
Dr. Or analyzed the possible s of a 
Brannan-Andrus and Lower LTones break if the Alternative P were 
stence. He concluded that export water quality would not 
be j zed because Alternative Plan could del 
flows of high quality water into the interior De 
"This provides both a hydraulic barr to 
prevent sal i intrusion and a buffer to 
mitigate the effects of any salts that might 
be drawn into the Delta in the unlikely event 
of a levee failure during a critical summer 
period." 
The capacity of the Alternative Plan to flush out salt water 
s caused a levee break would be greater the 
the ability to re se water directly into eastern and southern 
channels, ch would be import:ant in the event a levee failed 
the South Delta. 
So far as the effect of a levee break on 
alone is concerned, without regard to Delta water qual 
standards or contract obligations, the Peripheral Canal would 
the SHP the physical abili to continue and the 
qua of export water would not be adverse affected. 
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he Alternative an, some adverse effect on qua l 
occur during low flow conditions. On the other hand, export 
could be completely stopped by a break in a Peripheral Canal 
levee or siphon. 
cou 
De water users fear that a 1 Canal 
that is isolated from the Delta and therefore not vu le to 
lems cau by failure will allow the State to lk 
away" from the Delta. The State's obligation to meet contracts 
and water quality standards to protect beneficial Delta uses i 
not avo by levee failure. 
A joint DWR-Corps of Engineers study is underway 
on alternatives for Delta flood control and related prob 
The State provides matching funds to reclamation districts for 
levee repair and maintenance ("Way Bill"). However, the issue of 
the ultimate assignment of responsibility for De levees has 
not yet been resolved. 
D. Water Quality Comparisons 
Two aspects of water quality are invo , the 
quality of export water and of water in the Delta. The 
Peripheral Canal would assure that the quality of export water 
would be same as Sacramento River water qual Because the 
Alternative Plan is not isolated from the Delta, Sacramento 
water would continue to mix with poorer quality waters. The 
Alternative Plan would be an improvement over existing 
water qual would meet contractual export water l 
requirements, however. 
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The De ta water qual aspect is more 
complicated. th the Alternative Plan, Delta remains a 
"common pool" both for in-Delta users and for export. Export_ and 
Delta water quali would be the same. The project operators 
would be able to insure water qual on 
De quality. DWR calls this "automatic protection". 
The Per l Canal provides no " 
" to De users. Delta users argue 
have to re on " stitutional quarantees" conta 
would 
1n State 
federal statutes and constitutional provisions, State Water 
Resources Control Board decisions, and contracts with Delta 
agenc s which give De beneficial uses priori over export. 
The effectiveness of "institutional guarantees" is a question 
that has been intense debated for more than 20 vears, and ll 
continue to be a central issue. 
The Peripheral Canal cannot be bui alone. 
Several related facilities must also be built. With the 
l Canal, good water quality would not be 
cal the Western Delta. The Western Delta and Su sun 
Marsh would be suppl with overland facilities. The Contra 
Costa Canal Intake would have to be re to Clifton Court 
With the Alternative Plan, water qual in the 
Central and Southern Delta would be improved, and would be better 
quality than could be provided with the Peripheral Canal. 
total release capacity from Peripheral Canal would be 9,80 
CFS versus the Alternative Plan movement of 16,000 CFS 
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the rior Delta. there is s 1 l to 
re se 9,800 CFS, DWR can release only 6,300 CFS at 11 
pump rates.) The Contra Costa Canal Intake would not have to 
be moved, hut overland fac ities would still be needed 
Western Delta and Suisun Marsh. 
E. Impact on Fisheries 
The impact on fisheries of the Plan or 
1 Canal will depend on many factors -- the ef 
of fish screens, the velocity and direction of flow Delta 
ls, circulation or stagnation in some channels, and De 
outflow. 
The Department of Fish and Game has taken 
position that the Peripheral Canal is the best Delta transfer 
facility for fish and wildlife. The DFG has compared the ili 
of the Peripheral Canal and Alternative Plan to meet fish and 
wildli needs, and concluded that both plans would be an 
ss 
improvement over existing conditions since both wou the 
of on the fishery by eliminating flow s 
the San Joaqu at Antioch, but that the Peripheral Cana 
would improve fisheries to a greater extent. 
Both plans have risks to fish and ldlife 
resources. DFG states that the most critical factor fish 
ldlife is adequate Delta outflow, and both plans have same 
1 capabili to dep resources by reducing De 
outflow below needed flows. There are risks assoc 
building large, prototype fish screens on the Sacramento 
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r and 
Hood or Wa 
th r the Sacramento River below the 
Grove diversion points. 
The Peripheral Canal's 14 interior Delta release 
points could provide positive downstream flows in all Delta 
ls except in southernmost Delta. There 
ion and vvater temperat.ure problf:ms, however, the 
Central and Southern Delta due to inadequate circu 
ing fish mav follow flows released 14 
Per l Canal release points and may be "dead-ended" 
reach those release po s. This may create serious fi 
problems, in addit to the serious problems involved wi the 
fish screen at the Hood diversion point. Existing fish screens 
at the export pumps would not be necessary, however. [See 
discussion at Section 4.] 
Serious questions have also been raised with 
respect to the Alternative Plan. Increase in the velocity of 
water moving through Mokelumne, Old, and Middle River channels 
could decrease number of sh-food organisms in those 
channels. Reverse f would continue to st some Centra 
and Southern Delta channels. Upstream migrating fish can be 
confu by reverse flows. It has been suggested that reverse 
flows could occur Sutter and Steamboat Sloughs, but reverse 
flows in those sloughs would be prohibited by the North De 
Water Agency contract. 
A fish screen may have to be instal at 
Sacramento River diversion point. stream migrat fi cou 
by the diverted Sacramento River water to the 
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s of the fish screen. DFG has stated is no 
immediate technology available to solve that problem and 
estimates that 5 years of research and development might be 
needed. 
Improved fish screens may also be requ at the 
export pumps. DFG and DWR argue that the existing problem of 
water directly out of a major nursery area would 
exacerbated by increased exports. 
Dr. Orlob responds that maximum channel velocit s 
be "in the range of 1 to 1.2 feet per second", and 
constant circulation would be maintained in the interior and 
Southern Delta, minimizing stagnation, temperature increases, and 
reduced dissolved oxygen concentrations, all of which harm 
fish-food organisms. 
The Sacramento River fish screen would be smaller 
for the Alternative Plan since the 16,000 CFS capacity is lower 
than the Peripheral Canal 21,800 CFS capacity. As for the 
lem of upstream migrants reaching the back of the fish 
screen, Dr. Orlob suggests that upstream passage "can be 
accomplished either by 'false' jumping down through a 
of 1 to 2 feet or by sluicing of accumulated migrants, by 
periodic recirculation of some of the flow. Even periodic 
opening of the diversion facility to free passage of migrants is 
possible." The Alternative Plan does not create same type of 
obstacle to fish as the Peripheral Canal release points, for 
which physical removal and transfer of fish may be required. 
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Finally, Dr. Orlob has stated that improvement of 
screens may be necessary. 
fish 
Dr. Orlob urges that there are not substantial 
differences between the plans' fishery impacts, and "There are 
good and bad features in both plans, [and] neither will do al 
the DFG would like." The dominant concern for net Delta outf 
is not ly a matter of which plan is chosen and there is, as 
, no complete satisfactory solution to the fish screen 
lem e case. 
Dr. Orlob also criticizes DFG's "unfortunate 
choice" of striped bass as the main indicator of fishery 
conditions in the Delta, and argues that the commercially more 
Salmon important salmon should be the prime indicator instead. 
are mainly affected in the Delta by what happens to the 
Sacramento River. Dr. Orlob's comments raise the question 
whether potential harm to the Sacramento River salmon run should 
not outweigh continued harm to the San Joaquin nursery areas. 
The 1 Canal would eliminate pumping influence on an area 
comprises on 
but has uncalrulated 
salmon fisherv. 
14% of the striped bass 
of harming the Sacramento 
area, 
The P.lternative Plan would pump water from the 
Sacramento River only ?5% of the time, with a lower lift than 
the Peripheral Canal. These factors would mean that the 
Alternative Plan would have much less impact on the Sacramento 
Hiver fishery 
is an 
to Dr. Orlob. The DFG agrees that 
threat to Sacramento River fish with the 
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Pe 
-~ 
.L 
s. 
l , but has not the effect of two 
F. Cost Comparisons 
The relative cost of the Alternative Plan and 
Canal have been debated at length. Dr. Orlob has 
e s 1981 dol s for the Alternative Plan 
do not inc st costs~ 
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st of Alternative Plan 
dollars millions 
Sacramento 
Structure 
Intake 
16,000 CFS 
De 1 
Delta Levee Setbacks, 
lumne r 
ana Slough 
s 
s 
l\ 
l\lternative, 
present 
logy for 
fishery pro-
34.99 
4.67 
46.66 
s 2.33 
4.67 
7.00 
Delta Channel Improvements 9.33 
l Pumps 
Tom Pa Divers Canal 
Clifton Court Intake 
and Fish Screen 
Re s 
TOTAL 
10.50 
1.17 
23.22 
12.83 
50.16 
207 53 
107.3 
12.83 
46. 6 
2.3 
4.67 
7.00 
9.33 
10.50 
1.17 
58.32 
17.5 
se est s in 1981 dollars) can be compared with DHR 
lar es s of $680 1 Peripheral Canal plu 
3 mi for South Delta Water 1 Improvement Faci 
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lob s escalated cost f s 
s ng a 981- 986 construct schedule, at a 9% 
for construct cost increases, of $269 11 for 
ternative "A" and $479.5 Ilion for Alternative "B". These 
can be th DWR's escalated Can a 
costs of 51.289 llion p s an addi cost 
ll South De Hater 
Facilit s. DWR has prepared a document "DWR Pos on the 
Alternat Water Transfer Plan Proposed by the Central Delta 
~\Ia ter II 1982), which propounds a dif ba s 
for Per 1 Canal and Alternative Plan cost 
est Ss [See discussion of yield comparisons at 7B, 
above.] The Task Force s reservations concerning DWR's 
document and quest s the validity of the assuMptions DWR ses 
its coMparisons on. 
G. Comparison of Construction Schedules 
DWR's most optimistic schedule for bui the 
1 Canal is 1983-1988 Stage 1, 1986-1992 2, 
1988-1993 for 3. Dr. Orlob s est that 
struct of Alternative Plan would take 3 years, a 
has cost est s based on a 6-year construct 
chedule. m -i-. 1.es c..l.rnony cated that the l Canal 
Alternative Plan rnav ire additional research and deve 
92 
Intake 
SB 20 s for relocation of the Contra 
Costa Canal intake. The intake would not have to be relocated if 
Alternative Plan were 
I. 
Some 1 seepage is anticipated the 
lternat p , s water levels in some Delta ls ld 
sl y rai 25% of the t the system would be 
rat The 1 seepage would be less than 5% of that 
would be the Peripheral Canal, according to 
Or lob. 
The 1 Canal would be an unl earthen 
ditch water 10 above adjacent land. Dr. Orlob 
est s that between 5,000 and 20,000 acres may be "destroyed" 
from the Peripheral Canal. 
J. Bights-of-Way Required 
s-of-way for the Alternative Plan wou 
ire between 400 and 1,000 acres. The 1 Canal would 
ire 6,570 acres, of major bridges, and 
relocat of "J ' ll facil s. rights-o are 
ime agr ltural land. 
K. Interference With F Flows 
The AJ Plan includes channel s 
ch would 1 flood capacity in about 32 les 
of Delta channels in the and South Delta. No exi 
channe s would be b or constricted. 
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Can a rease the pos 
East De The Canal 
would block River and constr l'-1oke 
River F 
8. 1 Canal 
A. 
A s ificant factor cost of any lie 
ect s de De re 
ion costs. Var s de s are foreseeable concern 
20 , and construct de s, 
l~EPA-rf;lateci de s caused by l , and de 
SB 200 self. 
De construct of the Per Canal 
cau litigation has been widely anticipated. 
sed delay should s larly be anticipated '.C: l.L 
ive Plan were to be bui .) ACA 90 specifically provides 
for handling of likely lawsuits filed in State courts, 
not. s filed 1 courts, where manv ts be 
'I' he ACA 90 s form nuc of a 
st de for Task Force by Senator 
ACA 90 would any state court act 
s of SB 200 to be fi general one vear f 
the effect date of SB 200 in Sacramento Superior Court, to 
be renee over other matters. At the request of any 
Califo Court would be to transfer 
a ca to itself, before a decision the Court l, 
less the act wou not substantially affect 1 Canal 
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contract;, or compl 
ldli 
th water qual 
m•JR-DFG 
s or 
fi and 
ACA 90's list of potent 1 state court anti-Canal 
suit covers manv pass le actions. ACA 90 re s to 
"action or to , review, set as , vo , or 
f 
s desc 
to unc<~rta 
ts ch can be expected to be rai 
are (1) that SB 200 is canst 
and vagueness; (2) that SB 200 
1 vo 
l 
water qual s s r SWP contracts and 
Burns-Porter Act bond secur and (3) that SB 200 
Cali Constitution Article X Section 2 requirement 
water be to reasonab and beneficial use and not wasted. 
S lar in ACA 90 refers to any action to 
r 
attack the jo DWR and DFG determination after the 2 test 
pe that the Peripheral Canal Stage 1 fish screen and 
ope rat criteria are adequate. The d s' 
would se factual issues could a 
A.CA 90 s to cover all 
or proceeding 
1 Canal-related 
l t , any 
of 
the construction, ope 
Canal. s 
l Act ) 1 
would have 
, preventing, or substantial 
, or maintenance of the 
all Californ 
It would also 
on the basis of a Californ Constitution Art 
95 
effect 
1 
ronmenta 
s 
X 
Sect 2 cla water conservat should any 
construct 
ACA 90 would also expedite actions that would be 
to require DWR to operate the SWP to meet Delta water 
quali standards, basin p ans, and De contracts. More a 
dozen s have already been filed on various De water 
.ll issues, and more be expected . se poss 
lawsu s rnav or may not af Canal construction schedules. 
Dvm to comp l v the D\r?R-DFG 
fish and ldlife are ACA 90, 
would rect affect Canal construction. Construct cannot 
start until the is signed. An EIR is being on 
the agreement, could be the subject of a secondary avenue 
of attack. The "historical level" concept to be embodied the 
is nebulous, and invites 1 igation. 
Final , ACA 90 expedites actions brought to 
D\'lR to comp with contracts with the eight Delta water 
act s would be 
There are numerous seeable s that ACA 9 
does not cover 
ndicated that: 
"One of 
of issues 
a 
Canal and 
could affect construct Senator 
most potential prolific sources 
that could de the start of 
or even halt construction of the 
s tracks invo s the financing 
s, or lack thereof, to pay for 
other SB 200 facil s." 
Serious chal s have been made to the use of 
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taxes 
s .. 
the same for new revenue bond ssues a for 
outs inq general obl bonds. 
A second broad area not encompassed by ACA 90 concerns 
the relationship between the federal CVP and the SWP and 
Per l Cana . The Department of Interior and Bureau of 
Reclamat SB 2 
s s 
have taken a neutral position on the Canal. 
DWR mav not carry water for the CVP through Canal 
t 1 
o the 
is e ther ss 1 slation or Secreta 
enters a permanent contract th DWR that 
CVP to be to meet water qual 
A between the United States and 
on "historical level" fish and 
State 
st be entered ldlife 
requ s. If those act s are not taken and DWR s 
federal water through the Canal anyway, whether pursuant to a 
SWRCB order or not, litigation should be antic 
be very bas water rights problems involved as well. 
There 
[See 
iscussion at Section BC, below.] 
Fina , var s condemnation inverse 
and other 
cannot be antic 
scellaneous actions must 
th certainty which would de 
construction and ch would not. The range of poss le act 
lS SO 
B. 
Pe 
, however, that delays are probable. 
if the Fish Screen Doesn't Work? 
SB 200 requires DWR to construct Stage 1 of the 
l Canal and to portion of Canal 
period to test the fish screen at the Sacramento 
take to establish fish screen operational c 
97 
s 
a 
last of Pe ral Cana can on be constructed 
the Directors of DWR DFG both determine from resu s 
trial period "that the sh screen and operational cri 
ll adequately protect the fish population." (Water Code 
255 a .] 
.c 
L 
a 
The fish screen that will be tested the 2-vear 
tr pe wou not be the eventual full-size screen. The 
al pe would test a screen with a 5,450 CFS capac , wh 
is on one-fourth the size of final 21,800 CFS capac 
creen. DFG s that s ficant extrapo and 
J will be involved in determining whether a fish screen 
is four t s than the screen be tes will 
Testimony at Task Force hearings indicated that 
is no fish screen in existence of the type contemplated for the 
Sacramento intake to the Peripheral Canal. The most recent 
status of work on the fish screen was requested mvR and DFG, 
who report that their consultants ll be meeting in April to 
select a des for the 1 fish screen. DFG stated 
s a recommendat ll be to DVlR and DFG 
rectors June. The Task Force believes that s 
and any other s contemplated SB 20 
should be made available to the voters before the June e 
DFG had at one time cated that "logical course" 
would be to the screen and demonstrate that an 
ish screen could be lt before construction of the l 
Canal. However, SB 00 s construct of the Canal st, 
followed test of a smaller fish screen in place. 
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A ior l sue is whether of 
wnul d con nue o hP u ~>f'Cl i nr.c 
after the two-year trial period that the fish screen 
and operational criter would not adequately protect fish 
popu s. SB 200 states only 3 wou be 
con when the determination is made that the screen is 
SB 20 s not express state that 1 \'170Uld 
be if t were made. [An s been 
reque from the is Counsel on ·this • 1 lSSUe. J 
mm takes the pas it can operate 1 0 
the Canal even if fish screen does not work. 
OVJR argues the main problem with screen 
is go to be to rna in hydraulic capacitv, that they know the 
sh can be screened but they don't know if they can screen 
fish and divert enough water. 
DFG believes that is "inconceivable" the sh 
screen won't work. It states that Stage 1 would not be 
, but that anv necessary physical changes would be made 
·to make work. (A substantial contingency reserve 
pe be created to cover pass modification costs. DFG 
aqrees th DWR that the worst possible case would be to have 
only 1 f th one pumping capacity and one 
screen capacity, but Stage 1 could still be used. 
The Task Force believes that if the purpose of fi 
screens is to fish the Sacramento , a 
dete the screens did not work would cal 
the use of the screens and would consequently stop the use of 
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1. The s agrees th 
conclusion. That conclusion could also pass ly be 
course of CEQA/NEPA litigation, as well. The contrary 
that pol cal ssures would not allow the 
of the s 1 facilit s, is not 
rsua_s 
c. 
ll wheel CVP water the 
Pe l Canal whether or not United States 
f ial The November 1980 Draft Memorandum of 
between DFG and DWR also provides , if the l Cana 
is completed without federal participation, "the ect 11 
transport as much of the CVP export water through the Peripheral 
Canal for release into Old River at Clifton Court as is pract 1 
legally permissib 
DHR takes the position that m~m must carry CVP water 
because "can't do anything else physical " CVP water can be 
either to Old or to Clifton Court The 
CVP pumps would be mo,Ted to Clifton Court on eral 
were to agree to the terms SB 200 control 
federal use of the Pe 1 Canal. 
SB /00 speci lly provides that DWR "shall not 
transport water for the federal Central Valley Project through 
ect facili s, the Peripheral Canal" until the 
States agrees to 1 coordination of CVP and SWP 
ions, in compl water quality standards, and to a 
permanent 1-state sh and ldlife hi 1 levels 
100 
I:lay se wheel CVP water the 
Per 1 J. Canal on under lir1i.ted exceptions, or "+ l.L or de to 
do so by the State Water :Resources Control Board. The SWRCB 
order the SWP to carry federal water through the l 
Canal for fish purposes. 
D\i'JR argues that it would not be l CVP water 
for" the federal , and that SB 200 does not 
from tran water "of" the CVP. The reason for not 
al DVJR to tran water "for" the CVP, according to DWH, 
was to the federal government from using available 
city the California Aqueduct. The CVP De Can a 
has no iona capac with which to carry y ld 
the Peripheral Canal. DWR states that the intent of SB 200 was 
to prevent DWR from carrying CVP water to increase the CVP's 
capacity. DWR and DFG also argue that CVP water wou 
have to be carried by Peripheral Canal to protect fi es. 
DWR's stated pos ion is that it is "inconceivab 
Bureau of would not meet SB 200 Sect 
7 requirements if were to receive wheel benef s. S\'JP 
contractor Kern County Water Agency expects that the federal 
11 partie "as a matter of comi " s 
and CVP "are both in the Delta together". 
trJhat is meant by "participation" is not spelled out 
SB 200. DWH descr s the y ld of the Peripheral Canal as 
relatively very sive yield (although when to 
cost of exist facilit s, it is substantial more expens 
than existing yield) , and believes the Bureau of Rec 11 
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nt to c to a of 
mm may be will to to wheel CVP water, may dec 
not to sell any Peripheral Canal vield to the CVP. No cone sion 
can be drawn as to u nature of fed~ral parti 
or as to whether 
SB 200 terms. 
federal government ever will agree to 
The Bureau of Rec 's present posi is that 
has been and is now cooperat the SWP, but l "s on 
the fence" on the l Canal and SB 200 vote. SB 200 
res either ss l islation be enacted or the 
Inter enter into a permanent contract th mm 
" 11 coordination" of the CVP and SWP in compl v-1i th De 
water quality standards. The Bureau's Regional rector Cat 
stated that the United States cannot meet D-1485 Delta water 
quality standards without Congressional authorization. 
(Congressional authorization was a precondition to construction 
of the Peripheral Canal SB 346, the predecessor of SB 200.) 
In a 
Va ect \'Vater Assoc 
tten 
, the 
February to Centra 
of the 
stated s posit s con stently been the Inter 
"must ve control of CVP water supply so he can 
allocate a f water supply to CVP water users and 
repayment of project as mandated by the 
This will cant to be our position." The letter states 
that the "Bureau has never to support legis ion 
would make CVP operations sub to SWRCB." 
02 
F 
The Bure s si is based on the observat 
"If the CVP were subjected to any and all 
future SvJRCB decisions on water quality, 
imum fishery re ses, etc., without any 
authority ve in the Secretary, the CVP 
water supply would vary or change with each 
new action the SWRCB. Therefore, a CVP 
water user wou be placed a posit of 
having water from the project available only 
on a year-to-year basis. The SWRCB cou 
se the CVP operational plan and reduce 
to each water user. I 
stments necessary to the 
with an uncertain or 
II 
1 , the Inter letter states 
"We sh to assure you that we have no 
intention of resolving Delta water 
qual issue at the Federal water users' 
expense. We can also assure you that no 
s ion will be proposed to the Congress 
bv this Administration without a broad 
consensus f st being attained among 
Californ 's various water interests." 
1 
Federal-state negotiations concerning the coordinated 
operation of the projects have been going on for several 
DBR indicates that f 1 on a "Coord 
" mav be rea August. Cat 
no t 1 be finalized l vote on 
sit 9. 
r<Ir. Cat. also stated that, although the 1 
government does not take a position on SB 200, re must be a 
facility to get water through or around the Delta order 
to be able to deliver the yield from an enlarged sta 
reservoir, for 
There is, final , no definitive answer to the st 
of the S~'VP could 1 wheel CVP water through 
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Per l Canal thout " " It is 
clear whether or when ~he federal government agree to the 
terms of SB 200 in order jointlv to use the Canal. 
D. must 
The California Environmental Quality Act 
requires an environmental impact (EIR 
for the Peripheral Canal and any other facil or project 
would build or carry out. SB 200 specifically states 
Code §11255) , and Water must be th 
requ s that an EIR on the Canal include "a scuss 
sources of the 1, nutrient, biological 
the Sacramento River 11 • DWR must evaluate impacts 
1125 
of 
Canal 
have on those co:mponents and must mitigate adverse effects "to 
the extent practicable". Presumablv Section 11258 does not 1 
the scope of the Canal EIR. 
It should be anticipated that CEQA litigation 
See Sect SA, above.] The most like as 
be 
are 
that less environmental harmful a s are available 
should constructed instead of the Pe 1 Canal, 
that water conservat measures should precede any construct 
CEQA lawsu s can be circumvented by the s 
It is with the Legislature's power to amend CEQA if a CEQA 
action were b lementation of SB 200. 
The National Environmental Protection Act ( 
requires that an ronmental impact statement (EIS) be 
for federal projects. A federal EIS would have to be on 
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the Pe 1 Canal for at least one reason, that s 
would be brought in federal court and would not be expedited 
ACA 90, and NEPA could not be avoided bv the Cali 
slature. 
The Task Force has raised an important que 
has not abJe 1 to answer. That is, if an EIR i 
on the Per l Canal project, and adverse 
l s are identified and t ion could be 
only by building a different Delta trans il 
would the Peripheral Canal be bui anyway? Does SB 200 re 
that the Canal be built notwithstanding CEQA (and NEPA) by 
requiring that DWR 11 immediately proceed with activities 
prerequisite to [Canal] . • construction . . and . 
complete the design and commence construction as soon as 
possib "? 
The Legislative Counsel has concluded that if SB 200 is 
bv the voters, the Peripheral Canal is not on 
Delta water facility authorized to be constructed. That 
is based on the fact that SB 200 provides that the "Delta water 
T ,_, , ""~ . ;._ . n -~a.Cll.lLJ_es authorized the Burns-Porter Act inc s a 
"peripheral canal un " as described in SB 200. But 
SB 200 expressly restricts Burns-Porter Act Delta water 
facilities to Peripheral Canal, and there is nothing 
SB 200 that prohibits the construction of additional De water 
facil ies. 
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SB 200 and ACA 90 contain a number of provisions ~ .. 1hich 
proponents refer to as environmental protection provisions. 
These can be divided into two categories: (1) SB 200 provis s 
ch require certain agreements be made or which def 
certain StiiJP obl s; and (2) ACA 90 provisions make 
more dif cult to reduce or 1 certain protect s. 
Before 1 of the Peripheral Canal or 
1 Canal could , DWR and DFG must enter a 
agreement to protect fish and wildli and to restore, 
poss , adult populations of fish and 
ldlife at "historical levels" in the Delta, Suisun Marsh, 
San Francisco Bay. Three main criticisms of this requirement 
have been stated: (1) that the directors of DWR and DFG are 
poli cal appointees who are firm Canal supporters; (2) that 
" storical levels" is a vague concept would be verv 
diff to evalua·te what "historical levels" are or 
plans would actually restore fish and ldlife to 
storical levels"~ and (3) if DWR or DFG breach the 
in some way, who would sue to enforce agreement? 
After Stage 1 is lt, the sh screen would te 
for two years. No screen efficiency requirements are mandated 
SB 200. DWR and DFG alone decide whether the fish screen 11 be 
SB 200 does not specifically state that Stage 1 could 
not be used even if the screens were not adequate. 
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SB 200 requ s DvJR to enter and 
en ]e water r s water qualitv contracts with Delta 
water agencies for only 2/3 of the Delta and Suisun Marsh 
those agencies. One-third of the Delta could be left without a 
contract. The lines as to what the contracts must con 
are vague, and mention on quality, pre of on present 
uses, and that the contracts would l on from 
Delta. ACA 90 would prevent condemnation of contract 
lie agenc s, but enforcing the contracts might be 
fficult in emergencies and contractual r s l 
be subject to the police power in the event of emergenc s and to 
various attacks from competing interests. 
Before water can be transported for the federal 
government, the United States must agree to meet Delta water 
quality standards and fish and wildlife "historical level" 
requirements. SB 200 excepts from these requirements 
transportation of CVP water under existing wheeling contracts, 
for the San Fel Unit, and pursuant to SWRCB order. These 
ions could be broad int.erpreted. [See scussion at 
Section 8C, above.] 
Final , SB 200 requires the SWP to be to meet 
Delta water quali standards and to "rectifv" any failure of the 
CVP to help meet standards. Sv·JRCB standards can be changed 
the SWRCB at any t In fact, the SWRCB plans to reopen the 
Delta water qual 
sooner if Propos 
standards hearings by 1986, and pass 
9 passes. SWRCB standards have been 
challenged numerous lawsuits. 
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ACA 90 s to make it more fficult to reduce 
ct on provisions in SR 200, and addition~l 
makes it more difficu to develop north coast rivers. Delta 
protection cannot be weakened except bv a majority vote of the 
le. coast rivers cannot be deve e 
maj vote of the peop or a 2/3 vote of the slature. 
on how strong ACA 90 voting s s are 
on political power and voting strength. The Metropol 
'VJater ct of Southern California has confident s 
the opinion that can muster the necessary votes to 
north coast and change Delta protection when it needs to. 
San Joaquin Valley farmers and others, however, 
taken the position that ACA 90 is an extremely serious to 
water development. They do not have the voting strength MWD is 
relying upon. 
10. What Are Future Water Demands and Suppl s in the SWP 
Service Area? 
A. What are MlJD and Southern California demands and 
supplies? 
De ite the fact that information on water needs 
is 1 to SB 200, such formation is extreme ff to 
Demand est s depend on such imprecise factors as 
population, populat 
trends in per capita consumption. No single set of demand 
estimates have been generally accepted. 
An important debate is going on between the 
f.-1etropolitan vJater District of Southern California {MWD) and 
others on future demands and supplies in the Southern Cali 
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service area. argues that by 1985 or 1990, it 11 need 
the additional water that the Peripheral Canal would develop. 
Conversely, others argue that M\\JD will not need 
additional SWP vield that soon or possibly at all, and that 
alternative Delta facilities, increased conservation, poss le 
purchase of water that might be conserved by the Imper l 
District, and other options should be pursued 
a ss conservative analvsis of drought 
sks be used. Finally, they conclude that the Per 
Canal would not be necessary, because demands will be less than 
projected by ~frJD and dependable supplies are larger than 
pro:l ected by MvJD. 
The office of the General Manager of MWD has 
1 
an estimate of future drought year demands and supplies, dated 
March 3, 1982. That MWD document concludes that there will be a 
shortage in MWD's suppl s by the year 1990, if 1990 is as dry as 
1977, the driest year in California's history. The total 
projected by Mv'lD is 750,000 acre-feet. This seem to 
be a figure, even if were general accepted. However, 
figure represents only a 23% shortage overall the MvJD 
area a cr lly drv year. Shortages signi 
excess of 23% were experienced in many parts of California 
during 1977. 
!-1\iVD est s it will have to meet 1990 demands of 1.8 
MAF. This figure was derived as follows: 
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Cali 1990 
area demands 
Less probable local supp 
(principally groundwater) 
Less 1977 L.A. Aqueduct 
imports 
Net 1990 i\1\'JD demands 
s 
t·f\>JD's demand projections apparent 
3. 3 MAF 
( 1. 2 HAF) 
( .3 MAF) 
1. 8 ~tAF 
do not reflect 
savings fro~ conse SB 200 estimates water 
conse and wastewater reclamation will total 700,000 
acre-feet in SWP service areas by the year 2000. Of that amount 
approximately 600,000 acre-feet would be accomplished rn 
Cali The Task Force believes that conservation f s 
ld be applied to reduce projected demand estimates. 
M.vJD's demand projections have been criticized by M.\IIJD's 
former principal economist, John Burnham. Mr. Burnham notes that 
fJfND' s demand projections have been based on projected reases 
Southern California population, from 12 llion people in 
1980, to 15 11 year 2000. He does not those 
projections, but he does raise serious questions about MWD s 
conclusion that le popu is increasing by 25%, urban 
water use is projected to se by 33%. 
He argues that disparity is unrealistic two 
reasons. One, is a definite trend toward reduced 
ta consumption 11 result from expected increa 
population densi s -family residences, more 
and condominium development). Two, various water 
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s are now law 11 cons 
reduce r ta con by the year 2000. Mr. 
concludes "urban water use 11 increase now and 
2000 less rapidly than population, stead of more " 
~vD has consi al overest 
it s SWP contract in 1960, it was 
ject that it would 2,011,500 acre- 1990. 
nm..r est s wou need only 1,350,000 acre-feet of 
water 199 . 
r que s raised uses of 
!clWD water. M.VJD serves some water to users 
rep , as surp water. r1r. 
contends that: "These purposes can and should be 
convenient, but are not proper basis for new 
facilities be bui " The leni is 
pumped pr ilv for urban uses ns ll does not usti 
facil sure water 11 be avai 
repleni every year. rna of 
rep ishment] is to need for a constant 
a surp s water to be conserved in wet 
se dur years. 
These issues concern demand quest are 
£fer eva s of 1.vater l s 
rn Cali 
es s that would a 0 
" 50;000 acre-feet 199 if 1990 were a drv .l I , 
s supp is up f a net Co of 
11 
acre-feet, and a SWP of 600,000 acre- actua 1977 
deliveries of 200,000 acre-feet plus 400,000 acre-feet of water 
exchanged in 1977 with San Joaquin farners). 
It is uncertain what amount of Colorado River water 
vvill be avai to !1\\TD a r the Central zona ect (CAP 
comes on line 1985. The U.S. Supreme Court's 1963 decis 
Ar1zona v. Cali allotted California 4.4 llion acre-feet 
r vear, and Colorado Desert farmers ly Coachel 
ial have r s to 3. 85 f''l.AF per year are pr 
time to NJVD Is 1. 2 BAF vvhen the CAP starts 
r s l be l ted to 550,000 acre-feet per year the 
fference between 4. 4 MAF and 3. 85 MAF) . (This allocat may 
reduced by conveyance losses and Indian water r 
Since MND is now diverting only about 800,000 acre-feet year 
from the Colorado River, its actual present use wou be 
only approximately 350,000 acre-feet per year. rJ!WD assumes 
CAP use will build up by about 1990. 
s been made there may be lus 
Co water lab many s and that 1'1't'lD l be 
able to divert that surplus. Questions involving Co 
v ld are very complex, and the details of Co 
bank " programs are dif lt to evaluate. The Task Force has 
not received enough formation to assess those arguments, but 
believes that pass le purchase of Colorado River water, 
" " programs, and the availabilitv of surplus 1 s 
should be thoroughly investigated and pursued. 
11:: 
HiiJD Is S'VJP supp is based on 977 cri 
d t conditions. Even DWR calculates firm y ld on bas s 
o the less severe 1928-1934 drought period. 
The S\tiTP delivered 698,000 acre-feet to Mvm in 1981. 
m'. J.fllS amount is well below ~1\'m' s 1981 contract of 
1,157,300 acre-feet. MWD's contract entitlements will be at 
their maximum bv 1990, 2,011,500 acre-feet per year. The SvJP 
ll not have suffic yield without additional deve 
meet that maximum entitlement, however. DWR e s that the 
SWP would be able to liver to Southern Cali 1,250,00 
acre-feet 1990, of which approximately 1 HAF wou go to 
There is a discrepancy of approx ly 400,00 
acre-feet, therefore, between MWD's 1977-based estimate Dvm s 
1928-1934-based estimate which cannot be reconciled. Even s 
fference would reduce ~1\'1D' s estimated 23% deficiency to about a 
12% deficiency in a year as dry as the driest year California s 
ever experienced. In 1977, Los Ange s set conservation ls of 
25%, the State's 1977 Drought Emergency Task Force e 
that would not have to emergency plans into effect l 
v1a ter s fell below about one-half of normal per 
person use. 
One of the most far-reaching cri t isms of !>:lWD' s 
e s has been sed by Mr. Burnham. He argues MvJD is 
being far too conservative in the way it is applying " 
concepts. Southern California has five f sources of water 
lies: local groundwater basins, local surface water, s 
les Aqueduct, the lmD Colorado River Aqueduct, and S\•JP. 
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Mr. Burnham s bas thesis is that with f 
sources of supply, " is proper to plan not on the basis of firm 
y ld from each source, but on a basis approaching average 
yield.h If one or several supplies are reduced because of 
drought, groundwater pumping could be increased for the 
riod, for example, and replenished in wetter years. He 
Mvm to analyze water suppl s in insurance terms, us 
il analvsis of the risk that one or more sources 
be reduced, to 
would be 
whether the insurance benefits 
are worth the cost. Mr. Burnham testif 
the probabili that all five of Southern Cali 's suppl s 
would be severely reduced in one year is 1 in 2740. 
Demand and lv estimates are verv critical s 
in considering SB 200. No figures are generally agreed upon for 
Southern California. The Task Force has not been able to 
ascertain what the best supply and demand est s are, 
believes that. Ml'JD' s assumptions and estimates are clear 
que 
Californ 
le. If l water is actually 
by 1990, however, should be 
Pe ral Canal is not scheduled to be camp 
a through-Delta plan, such as the one 
it 
1 94. 
'fask Force Dr. Or lob, apparently could be camp be 
di'lte. 
B. What will the San Joaquin Valley need? 
Bullet 132-BJ. shows that San Joaquin Val 
contractors have general requested water deliver s excess 
of ir SWP contract entitlements. When delivered, SWP "surp s 
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water" over entit amounts is pa for pursuant to 
long-standing surp s water contracts. Delivery of surplus water 
is part of the total SWP program. 
Except during periods of drought, water in excess of 
the SWP firm yield is available to the SWP in the Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta. Such unscheduled water is available only a 
meeting water rights of users in and upstream the Delta, 
prior rights of the CVP, Delta outflow requirements estab 
by the SWRCB under s Decision 1485, and SWP entitlements. All 
SWP supplies are f st made available to meet requests for 
contract entitlement water. Any excess supplies are then 
available to SWP contractors as "surplus water" and paid for at 
the incremental cost of delivering such water. 
DHR Bulletin 160-74 (November, 1974), the 
Bookman-Edmonston Report on Water Resources Management 
Southern San Joaquin Valley (January, 1979), and other sources 
indicate that the current water demand is in excess of the 
current le water supply in the area bv 
r,ftJ\F annual This de iency is met by overdra of 
in the same amount. There is not sufficient additional SWP 
supply available to the San Joaquin Valley to offset 
overdraft. 
1.5 
sent 
Unless additional water supplies are made availab to 
the San Joaquin Valley, one of two things is likely to re 
Either groundwater levels 11 continue to drop, with con 
increases in the cost of groundwater pumping, or substant 1 
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r 
11 be taken out of product Some comb of 
these undesirable alternatives is most like 
The Task Force feels the evidence presented 
demonstrates immediate needs for imported agricultural water 
the San Joaquin Valley. However, the Task Force bel s there 
are substantial constraints on agriculture's abil to pay for 
supplies. 
The conclusions necessarily drawn from these 
are that agriculture needs its water as soon as pass and at 
cheapest affordable cost. 
11. Is it possible to avo additional export by economic, 
conservation, or legal and institutional changes? 
The vote on Proposition 9 will dictate to a great extent 
future water development policy in California. It is a 
"watershed'' decision either to proceed with the construction of 
more facilities to develop new yield in the magnitude proposed 
SB 200 or to change rection and evaluate much more c se the 
potential for increasing suppl s and reducing demand by less 
tional measures. 
Every a to additional facilit s for of 
water should be ful studied. Water conservation, wastewater 
and sa water reclamat , water banking, water trans 
coniunctive use of groundwater basins to store supplemental 
surface water are important now, and will become increasingly 
important the future. Besides possible implementation of 
sical programs for conservation, reclamation, and 
, there may be beneficial changes which can be made 
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1 and institutional systems for water rights and 
which could Jesson to~al demand. 
DvJR ha:; given con:;iderable attention to the less tradi t l 
approaches to meeting water needs. Bulletin 76-81 describes in 
detail manv potential conservation, reclamation, groundwater 
storage, and water banking and exchange programs. 
The Task Force has discussed only a few of the potentia 
conservation-related measures which might be pursued. It s 
very subs 1 reductions in urban demand have re 
and can continue to increase from water conservation. 
potential savings from agricultural water conservation are more 
speculative, but some conservation is unquestionably feasible. 
Groundwater storage may also provide substantial yie s. 
appears that there is, however, considerable institutional and 
political resistance to the storage by DWR of SWP water in 
groundwater basins. The source of at least some of that 
resistance apparently stems from the fact that the more SWP water 
D\rJR stores in groundwater basins, the ss "surplus" water 11 
he available to San Joaquin Valley contractors. 
Water transfer is highly touted by economists as a way to 
reduce overall demand. Transfers were extremely important 
1976-1977 drought and are important this year to 
consequences of the San Luis dam failure. Water transfer, 
however, must be linked to strong provisions for the protection 
of the areas of of the transferred water. 
The Task Force has been impressed by how much water could be 
saved (or how la the reductions in demand could be) as a 
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result of conservation measures. SB 200 contains est 
programs, and 700,000 acre-feet per year from urban water 
conservation and wastewater reclamation. 
DWR has published a report on potential sav the 
Imperial Irrigation District (IID). IID diverts approximate 
2.8 ~~F per year from the Colorado River. After use by IID 
farmers, approximately 1.1 HAF wastes into the Salton Sea. Dvm 
stigated IID operations and concluded that there is an 
overall opportunity for saving about 438,000 acre-feet of water 
per year. Water losses are occurring mainly from seepage 
unlined canals, spillage from canals where more water is 
than can be used, and on-farm losses. 
The relationship between water conservation figures and 
projected demands is treated differently by various groups. The 
Task Force believes that conservation estimates should be used to 
offset projected demands. DWR's and MWD's refusal to decrease 
demand es s by proje conservation estimates does not 
seem to be a logical approach. Conservation can c 
ultimate demand. 
If Proposition 9 does not pass, can the Peripheral Cana 
built anyway or some of the other SB 200 facilities? 
Alternative Plan? 
The Legislative Counsel prepared an opinion on these 
questions. The Counsel concluded that, even if SB 200 is 
rejected by the voters, DWR is authorized under existing 
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Burns-Porter Act to 
SWP. DWR has "broad 
ld the Per 1 Canal as part of the 
ty" over project construction and the 
choice of which particular facilities of the project are lt. 
The Legislative Counsel stated that "we think it is clear that 
the courts would not interfere with the of 
to construct a 'Peripheral Canal' under the 
Burns-Porter Act ization of facil s 'trans 0 
Delta'." water across 
In re 
a so 
to a question, the 
Glenn Reservoir could be built 
slative Coun 
DWR even 
SB 200 is rej by the voters. That authori comes from 
DWR's broad authori to ld additional SWP facili s to 
augment water supplies in the Delta. 
The Legislative Counsel also testified that the 
p could built even if Proposition 9 does not pass. 
same "broad authority" would allow DWR to build 
1 Canal would allow it to bui the Alternat 
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